A Double Reset: Can EU Diplomacy Help Revive Climate Multilateralism?

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In December 2025, after Belém, the year ended badly for the European Union. The EU felt angry and isolated, accused of trade wars it felt it did not start, unable or unwilling to rethink its relationships with the United States, or with China, and caught in the middle as energy was weaponized, again, as a tool of power. Meanwhile, experts were announcing a liquefied natural gas  "tsunami" — a supply glut from massive new production capacity — particularly in the US and Gulf countries, that could postpone for decades the global clean transition just discussed at COP30.

In mid-2026, the EU looks different: a bit more forward-looking, intentional and determined. What did it take? Only the threat of an invasion of Greenland by an historic ally; a defiant Canadian speech in Davos; a war on Iran that triggered the worst energy crisis in history; a U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating tariff decisions made by the Trump administration; and a momentous general election in Hungary.

After eighteen months of procrastination and hunkering down, the EU seems finally poised for a "reset" and ready to confront both current emergencies and long-term challenges in accordance with its existing laws and international commitments. Domestically, it is accelerating industrial decarbonization and electrification; internationally, it is trying to position itself to reconcile international cooperation and multilateralism while defending its economic security and the competitiveness of its industries.

How does all this translate into the EU's climate diplomacy?

First, on the bilateral front, the EU is accelerating the negotiation of bilateral agreements and partnerships to secure both its supply chains and export markets and protect itself against trade and energy shocks coming from either China or the U.S. The EU also wants to demonstrate that its new clean trade and investment partnership (CTIP) with South Africa, as well as its next generation free trade agreements with India, Mexico, Mercosur the Republic of Korea and Australia are effective tools to both fight climate change and boost the economies of all partners.

For example, the EU plans to mobilize sustainable finance and green investment via EU development banks and export credit agencies. It's also looking to promote clean technologies and environmental social governance standards, including in public procurement and secure better access to critical minerals. One indicator that these arrangements are successful will be concrete and mutually beneficial results on the clean energy transition, based on a solid domestic manufacturing infrastructure.

Needless to say, there is still a long way to go, particularly when it comes to including non-G20 countries in this endeavor. The EU must prioritize supporting developing countries' efforts to transition away from fossil fuels and deploy clean energy-based electrification, or to design and implement economy-wide adaptation plans.

Beyond this, it would be encouraging to see the EU work jointly with India and China in support of other countries’ attempts to transition away from fossil fuels to clean energy. While the EU and China still have not figured out a way to address the very real and growing strains from trade disputes and industrial restrictions, there remain spaces where they can cooperate in a very pragmatic way with countries in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. When it comes to clean energy, China's advantages in manufacturing scale and cost efficiency can complement Europe's strengths in regulation, finance, system integration, and innovation. For instance, the recent and promising launch by the EU, Brazil and China of an open coalition to boost the integrity and effectiveness of carbon markets is a good basis to build from.

Second, like all remaining main climate diplomacy actors, starting with China, the EU has made the key political choice of continuing to participate actively in the multilateral climate space, seeing it as the only "big tent" left. This was not a given in the midst of the ongoing attacks on multilateralism and the decline in international climate cooperation. In addition, and while some governments elected to stay in the Paris Agreement but slow down and sometimes fully reverse their climate actions, the EU keeps doing the hard work to implement its climate commitments at home and continuing to engage with allies and like-minded partners to accelerate climate solutions.

On the international stage, this translates as coalitions of countries, supported by various stakeholders, moving forward faster to implement their commitments. Some of these coalitions, like the group of countries and multi-stakeholder initiatives that met in June 2026 in Santa Marta, Colombia to work on the transition away from fossil fuels, are loose; others like the C40 network of mayors have tighter work programs and agendas. Such "coalitions of the willing" are helpful in accelerating action and testing new ideas. Similarly, we need smaller meeting spaces like London or Bangkok's climate weeks for like-minded actors to come together.

However, coalitions, initiatives and club-like meetings are not enough. For example, "coalitions of the willing" may leave out actors that lack not ambition, but capacity or finance. Moreover, the EU, and other defenders of multilateralism like China or the Alliance of Small Island States, have a responsibility to show that the response to the continued attacks on the Paris Agreement or on the clean and just transition is not and cannot be a retreat into spaces designed for "ike-minded" only—what I call the “Bluesky-ization” of the climate space.

On the contrary, the EU can lead the way to demonstrate that COPs are necessary precisely because they provide a space to meet with "unlike-minded" countries and groups. These include the Arab Group and fossil-fuel producing countries more broadly which are currently facing some tough choices. It is essential that countries retain a space to discuss and implement policies, experiences and solutions in a non-adversarial way. This means playing an active role in making COPs attractive for everyone, including for the so-called "real economy" players (corporate and financial actors) and not just for the usual participants.

Having a "big tent" COP, however, brings obvious challenges: the participation of bad-faith actors actively engaged in the undermining the climate agenda. The EU would be wise to remember that true multilateralism means not only having a space where everyone is allowed but also and as importantly, defending the consensus rule which gives an equal voice to each country, regardless of its political or economic status. Yes, consensus can be hard to reach, but it is the only way to protect the agency and role of smaller countries that have limited delegations and means of action. Yes, building consensus is work: It means forming large coalitions, listening to everyone's concerns, and finding compromises. The EU, which has always prided itself on constructing such coalitions, can engage anew in this patient and very necessary work of actual building a big tent.

Third, the EU has embraced the idea that climate multilateralism needs to be simultaneously top-down—a space where common norms and rules are negotiated—and bottom-up—meaning solutions-oriented, and delivering concrete results for everyone.

There is a clear call for COP31 under the Türkiye Presidency to focus on implementation. The evolution of COPs in the past 10 years lends itself to such a project of affirmation of "bottom-up multilateralism." Since COP20 in Lima in 2014, COPs have seen an expansion of the so-called "action agenda," the space devoted to showcasing to negotiators and governments the concrete social and economic benefits of decarbonizing and climate-proofing of the "real economy." Even more decisive was Brazil’s move to bridge the negotiation and climate action spaces and define six thematic axes, all designed to fill gaps and deliver against the Global Stocktake (GST) outcomes agreed at COP28 in Dubai.

This strong emphasis on the action agenda inevitably creates a tension between those who believe that the UNFCCC is first and foremost a "norm-creating" space and those who think that, in the midst of current dislocations, COPs must be a global trust-building and results-based space. The EU is well placed to show that both are needed through its role in the negotiations and its active showcasing of its cooperation projects with the Global Gateway. It is interesting that it is precisely in this moment of "tension" that governments decided to delegate the organization of these two functions to a twin Türkiye-Australia COP presidency. The EU should actively work with both governments to ensure it is a blessing and not a curse.

The very live discussion around the idea of a "two-tier" or "two-track" multilateralism separating the consensus-based negotiation space from the coalition-based implementation space might have misled some to believe that multilateralism can be à la carte. Let's be clear, though: implementation of COP commitments is not optional, especially with regard to still-rising emissions and the clear and present danger of 1.5 degree Celsius overshoot. Higher ambition by some does not excuse less ambition from others. As much as some countries do need more time and help, there are some laggards unwilling or too slow to implement their commitments (from energy to finance) and they should be called out. As much as some countries do need more time and help and are entitled to get it, there are some laggards unwilling or too slow to implement their commitments (from energy to finance) and they should be called out. And negotiations are still very much needed, as demonstrated by current meetings on plastics or maritime issues.

As for climate change, even if most of the rules applying to the current situation have been agreed, one can already anticipate that, very soon, negotiators will be called to provide some guidance and rules on issues like the energy-guzzling artificial intelligence, for example. But that's for a different article.