Climate Diplomacy with Chinese Dimensions

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A decade after the Paris Agreement entered into force, international climate action faces existential pressure. There is no way to sugarcoat it: climate has been deprioritized on government agendas, global climate gatherings command far less attention, and major powers that once treated climate change as a domain of cooperation now see it as a source of economic tension.

Featured Expert: 

Li Shuo Director of China Climate Hub, Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI)

Worse still, we have likely not yet reached the bottom. The conditions for global climate action are poised to deteriorate further before they improve. It is important to state this daunting reality plainly — not to deepen pessimism, but because a clear-eyed assessment of global realities, still too often missing in the climate community, is essential for rebuilding an effective strategy. The China dimension I propose should be an integral part of that solution.

The list of challenges is long, but three structural shifts stand out.

First, domestic politics in major economies have turned against ambitious climate action, even as geopolitical relations have frayed. In the United States, a second Trump administration has rolled back domestic efforts and actively undermined international initiatives. Europe, long the standard-bearer of climate ambition, is navigating a rightward political shift, with industries pressing hard to dilute environmental standards under competitive pressure. China, facing slower economic growth and the aftershocks of prolonged geopolitical rivalry with Washington, has grown more cautious and transactional in its approach to international cooperation.

Second, escalating geopolitical volatility has crowded out climate priorities. Trade tensions, exemplified by President Trump's tariff war, have dominated the global agenda, making it harder to sustain focus on core processes such as developing new nationally determined contributions (NDCs) in 2025. The prolonged war in Ukraine continues to drain European resources, constraining Brussels' climate finance contributions. The conflict in Iran and the Middle East further diverts already scarce political attention away from decarbonization.

Third, the traditional tools of climate diplomacy are showing their limits. NDCs and headline commitments emerging from COP processes have too often prioritized ambition on paper over transformation in practice. Political declarations attract attention, but accountability in implementation remains scarce. In a more fragmented and volatile geopolitical environment, these instruments are no longer fit for purpose. Doubling down on them does more to harm the credibility of multilateralism than to advance it.

Some in the climate community have sought to adapt by leveraging geopolitical competition. But many of these efforts are misguided. In some cases, they rest on an incomplete reading of geopolitical dynamics; in others, they risk reinforcing the very forces that undermine cooperation. Proposals for a U.S. carbon border adjustment mechanism without a corresponding domestic carbon price, for instance, may do more to entrench protectionism — the natural adversary of international collaboration — than to meaningfully reduce emissions.

To be clear, most of these challenges are not the result of flawed climate diplomacy; they reflect the turbulence of the world we now inhabit. The key point for the climate community is that these structural forces cannot be wished away. A recalibration of international climate diplomacy is urgently needed, one that takes the following three observations into account, each carrying a consequential Chinese dimension.

First, climate action is returning to its economic fundamentals, and climate diplomacy must be understood accordingly — as one component of a broader mosaic — no longer the primary driver, but still an important supporting force. A country's decarbonization trajectory will increasingly depend less on external diplomatic pressure and more on its ability to align growth with low-carbon transformation. In that sense, climate action is evolving from a diplomatic exercise into an economic race — and that is not necessarily a bad thing.

Second, among all major emitters, China's role in future climate diplomacy will be the most consequential, and perhaps the most hopeful. This is no longer primarily because China is the world's largest emitter, but because it has become the single most important provider of clean energy solutions. China now accounts for roughly 80% of global solar supply, over 70% of batteries and electric vehicles. This unprecedented industrial advantage represents a strategic inflection point that no other economy has the luxury of occupying. In a world where climate action was once seen as a constraint on growth but is now increasingly a driver of it, China faces a singular question: will it step into a leadership role not out of obligation, but out of self-interest? Nudging Beijing's answer toward "yes" is one of the great diplomatic opportunities of this moment.

Third, without functioning climate relationships between the United States and China, and between Europe and China, global progress will remain constrained. The absence of a productive EU-China relationship has already limited outcomes at COP30 in Belém, and there is little sign of near-term improvement. This makes it an urgent priority for diplomatic investment.  Both sides should begin with a modest but practical goal: jointly facilitating a smooth and successful COP31, while rebuilding trust over time and finding ways to cooperate on climate even as they continue to manage their broader economic differences. At the same time, groundwork must be laid now for a future U.S.-China climate channel, should a more climate-engaged administration emerge in Washington. The obstacles are substantial. Chief among them is the entanglement of climate cooperation with trade and industrial tensions. Any renewed dialogue will quickly confront a central question from Beijing: how can the U.S.  pursue decoupling and decarbonization at the same time? Or, put more plainly: where will U.S. solar panels and batteries come from when trade and investment barriers have been erected against the world's dominant supplier? Absent a credible answer, U.S.-China climate engagement risks stalling, leaving global progress to proceed, at best, at a suboptimal pace in the foreseeable future.

The path forward is narrow but not closed. Rebuilding effective international climate diplomacy will require letting go of unrealistic expectations about old tools that no longer function well and an honest reckoning with a geopolitical landscape that has fundamentally shifted. Above all, it will require a clearer understanding of where genuine leverage still exists. Although many countries see China's industrial rise in clean technologies as a challenge to be managed, it is also an asset to be harnessed. The countries and coalitions that recognize this first will be best positioned to shape the next chapter of global climate action.