The global climate crisis demands transformative action supported by unprecedented financial resources. Emerging market and developing economies (excluding China) will require an estimated $3.2 trillion annually by 2035 to meet their climate action needs. To help address this, the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) established at COP29 aims for $300 billion annually by 2035, with an ambition to reach $1.3 trillion. Meeting this massive demand requires scaling up concessional funds, mobilizing private capital, and—crucially—diversifying financial streams beyond traditional North-South channels.

In this shifting landscape, nontraditional climate finance is increasingly recognized as a vital complement to traditional funding. While developed nations (Annex II countries) have formal obligations to provide climate finance under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), many non-Annex II countries—representing both major emerging markets and advanced economies—are voluntarily providing critical financial support through multilateral and South-South cooperation.

Despite their growing role, these nontraditional financial flows remain underrecognized and underreported. Because non-Annex II countries’ reporting is voluntary and lacks standardized disclosure methodologies, existing data is highly fragmented. Without a systematic, multicountry analysis, the global community has lacked a clear baseline against which to measure progress, evaluate needs, or inform international policy.

This working paper addresses that critical blind spot by providing the first systematic estimate of climate finance contributions from 14 non-Annex II countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates. To establish a transparent and comparable baseline, the research adapts the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) accounting framework and DAC Rio markers, evaluating across four components: bilateral public finance, multilateral public finance, export credits, and mobilized private finance.

The analysis reveals that from 2013 to 2023, these 14 nations provided an estimated $102.38 billion in climate finance to other developing countries, with contributions accelerating sharply since 2020. Multilateral channels account for the vast majority of these flows, reaching nearly 80 percent by 2023. While China contributed the largest share—often driven by large-scale, capital-intensive mitigation infrastructure—the underlying trends among the other 13 nations reveal a strong focus on adaptation, which makes up 53 percent of their non-multilateral finance. The data also highlights critical gaps, noting that highly vulnerable low-income countries received just 8 percent of non-multilateral flows.

Ultimately, this research demonstrates that non-Annex II countries are no longer just recipients of climate finance—they are active, vital providers. By establishing a replicable baseline, this paper provides empirical insights necessary for the rigorous implementation of the Baku to Belém (B2B) Roadmap. Acknowledging and standardizing this data is a vital prerequisite for reshaping the international financial architecture and unlocking the full potential of a more inclusive, multipolar climate finance system.

The supplemental materials are datasets used in this paper, divided into multilateral public finance and all other non-multilateral public finance including bilateral public, export credits and mobilized private finance.

Key Findings

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  • We estimate that the total climate finance contribution from the 14 non–Annex II countries reached $102.38 billion between 2013 and 2023. Contributions have accelerated since 2020, signaling these nations’ evolving role as voluntary contributors—not just recipients—in the interna tional landscape. China contributed the largest share, followed by South Korea, India, and Brazil.
  • The climate finance provided by these non–Annex II countries reflects their dual priorities: their own domestic development, mitigation, and resilience needs as well as voluntary international support. Without formal obligations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), most embed their international climate finance contribution within broader foreign policy and development agendas.
  • Multilateral channels account for most of the 14 non Annex II countries’ contributions—78 percent in 2023. These flow through multilateral development banks and climate funds such as the Green Climate Fund and Global Environment Facility and provide funding for mitigation and adaptation, and is driven by both an overall increase in the volume of climate finance disbursed by multilateral institutions and a significant increase in contributions and the capital shares held by these 14 nations.
  • The aggregate trend in non-multilateral finance shows high project-based volatility rather than a steady linear progression. These fluctuations reflect the “lumpy” nature of capital-intensive infrastructure finance, where total volumes are often anchored by a small number of deals.
  • Beyond the major infrastructure spikes largely driven by China’s heavily mitigation-focused portfolio, the underlying trends among other countries reveal a focus on adaptation. Since 2020, the remaining 13 non–Annex II countries have allocated an estimated 53 percent of their total non-multilateral finance (which includes bilateral public, export credits, and mobilized private climate finance) to adaptation and crosscutting (both adaptation and mitigation) projects, compared to a smaller share for purely mitigation projects.
  • Non–Annex II countries are no longer just recipients—they are active providers of climate finance. Their contributions, though voluntary and often underreported, are growing and increasingly vital to achieving global climate goals.
  • Establishing a credible baseline is a critical step toward building a more inclusive and effective climate finance system. As the global community moves from the high-level targets of COP29 into the rigorous implementation phase WORKING PAPER | June 2026 | 5 of the Baku to Belém (B2B) Roadmap to 1.3T, the lack of a transparent baseline for nontraditional climate finance remains a critical blind spot. Our findings demonstrate that these 14 countries are already significant providers of climate finance; acknowledging and standardizing these data is not merely an accounting exercise but a prerequisite for the “revamping” and “reshaping” of the international financial architecture called for in the B2B framework.
  • This paper’s findings provide empirical support for the Sevilla Commitment (FfD4), which advocated for a more inclusive, multipolar financial system that respects the diverse modalities of developing countries. By documenting the scale and sectoral focus of nontraditional climate finance flows, we show that “development sovereignty” is already being exercised through climate-related cooperation. Future track ing efforts must move beyond the North–South binary to fully integrate these flows into the global monitoring systems envisioned in Seville.