Topic: japan

The Japanese Fast-Start Finance Contribution

Sarah Parsons — Wed, 28 Nov 2012 12:42:08 -0500

Executive Summary

Developed country governments have repeatedly committed to provide new and additional finance to help developing countries transition to low-carbon and climate-resilient growth. This assessment considers Japan’s efforts to provide “fast start finance” (FSF) between January 2010 and February 2012 in the context of the pledge by developed countries to mobilize USD 30 billion from 2010 to 2012 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is part of a series scrutinizing how developed countries are defining, delivering, and reporting FSF.

Given the size of its economy, Japan has a major role to play in delivering FSF.

Japan’s USD 15 billion FSF commitment is one of the largest amongst developed countries, but it is important to consider the contents of this commitment. Japan has played a significant role in global efforts to finance climate change activities in developing countries, and its FSF commitments accounts for almost half of the FSF that developed countries have pledged for 2010-2012. However, it is essential to better understand the broad range of instruments and activities that the government includes in its FSF, as different governments consider different types of finance to constitute FSF, so self-reported figures are not directly comparable between countries.

Other official flows (OOF) such as export and investment insurance, non-concessional loans, and guarantees make up around 40% of Japan’s total FSF contribution so far, and there is some ambiguity around the role of leveraged private finance. OOF amounts to as much as USD 5.1 billion of the USD 13.2 billion mobilized by 29 February 2012 sincethe announcement of the Hatoyama Initiative in September 2009. This includes USD 3.1 billion of leveraged private finance. While the role of leveraged private finance in the Japanese pledge is ambiguous, as discussed in the section on Methodology, we have included it in the analysis presented in this paper.

Japanese FSF is heavily weighted toward mitigation. About 70 percent of Japanese FSF addresses mitigation objectives. Most mitigation finance, in turn, is financed through loans (both ODA and non-ODA), which constitute about 75 percent of the contribution for infrastructure development projects, such as urban transport projects. There is a more even balance between adaptation and mitigation objectives within the grant portion of the FSF contribution (adaptation: 30 percent, mitigation and REDD+: 27 percent, multiple objectives: 43 percent). A significant share of Japanese FSF addresses one or more non-climate objectives in addition to mitigation or adaptation urban transport projects. Asia receives the most FSF among all regions, irrespective of financial instrument type. It is worth noting that the Japanese FSF includes a number of “clean” fossil fuel power plant construction projects, such as a natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) power plant project in Central Asia. There is a need for greater clarity amongst members of the international community about how support for lower carbon fossil fuel facilities should be treated in the context of climate finance.

On balance, it is not clear that the entirety of the Japanese FSF is “new and additional.” While the FSF contribution reflects some new effort to address climate change, it is unclear that the contribution as a whole can be considered “new and additional.” Since the start of the FSF period, Japan has substantially increased international finance that explicitly targets climate change. Some Japanese agencies have also begun integrating climate change into aspects of development assistance and development finance. Applying five different criteria proposed by experts and practitioners, however, the results indicate that at least a portion of the Japanese FSF spend is not new and additional. A significant share of Japanese FSF reflects pre-existing pledges to development assistance initiatives to scale up climate change related finance such as those articulated in the Japan Cool Earth Partnership of 2008. Furthermore, Japan’s FSF cannot be seen as additional to its existing commitments to scale up development finance to 0.7 percent of its GNI.

FSF reporting follows Japan’s standard processes for reporting on conventional development assistance, whose transparency can be strengthened to meet new needs associated with FSF. There is room for improvement in terms of the transparency, accountability and credibility of Japanese FSF. Some of the identified issues may be attributable to the fact that Japanese FSF contains a large number of projects supported by a variety of channeling institutions. This has made it difficult for the government to present a clear overview of Japanese FSF.

The largest issue is that the information on FSF is disaggregated, although project-level information provided by the implementing agencies is detailed. Most of the climate finance projects could not be easily identified without extensive key word research on the websites of implementing agencies. This study identified about 250 likely FSF projects, amounting to USD 11.7 billion or nearly 90 percent of the amount committed by 29 February 2012. At the same time, about 500 FSF projects – most of which are of relatively low monetary value – could not be independently identified.

The Japanese government has already taken steps to strengthen the transparency of Japanese FSF, such as adding information about channeling institutions to the list of FSF projects included in its second submission to the UNFCCC. However, additional information would facilitate an informed discussion of the adequacy of FSF efforts. The following practices would further strengthen the transparency of Japanese climate finance reporting:

Provide a complete list of the projects that have been supported through the Japan FSF spend. Specify the climate finance projects that constitute aggregated numbers in the official documentation;
Include hyperlinks to the relevant webpages that describe the projects that have been supported through FSF in this proposed project list, as this would substantially enhance stakeholder access to information on the FSF contribution and understanding of its objectives;
Compile all information on its climate finance contributions in one easily accessible format, and support access to supporting information on the individual projects that constitute the FSF spend;
Explain the eligibility criteria for the ODA and OOF flows that have been counted towards the FSF contribution;
Work in cooperation with other contributor countries and multilateral institutions to strengthen and harmonize bilateral and multilateral reporting on climate finance.

Delivering on the Clean Energy Economy: The Role of Policy in Developing Successful Domestic Solar and Wind Industries

Sarah Parsons — Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:57:39 -0500

Executive Summary

Data Explorer Tool

The release of this paper is accompanied by the launch of an interactive Data Explorer Tool, which enables users to view, chart, and compare underlying data from our research.

Users can explore data for a specific country–or see how that country stacks up against others–in terms of correlating select “benefits” (manufacturing, domestic installations, and jobs) with changes in key national policies. In addition to pulling out raw data, the tool allows users to uncover the stories inside the numbers: For example, how does the growth in wind manufacturing capacity in China compare to the U.S. over the past 10 years? And what key policies were introduced in both countries over that period?

The renewable energy industry is expanding to meet the needs of a large and growing global market for clean and secure energy. This growth is likely to continue, with electricity production from non-hydro renewable energy sources expected to grow more than eight-fold from 2009 to 2035, if countries implement their existing commitments, and draw nearly US$3 trillion in investment. In this globalized industry, no single country has a monopoly on the supply chain or the opportunities to benefit from this expansion.

Competition is fierce and the industry is changing rapidly. Energy—and electricity in particular—is a highly policy dependent market, strongly shaped by regulation, incentives, and public goals. There are a number of different factors that drive policymakers to consider the development of domestic renewable energy industries including energy security, environmental considerations, providing more universal access to energy, and as an economic development opportunity. Now, many policymakers are weighing how to take advantage of improvements in the renewable energy global supply chains that include lower costs, higher quality equipment, and improved performance to deliver domestic energy more cheaply, while still nurturing and protecting domestic industries that create highly visible “green jobs.”

These two goals—creating robust and growing domestic industries and delivering affordable domestic energy—are both central to business-as-usual economic development. Doing both in the context of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and other environmental impacts delivers on the promise of green growth in the energy sector. In nearly every country, it is politically very difficult to pursue one of these goals to the exclusion of the other. There is little political patience with using public resources to support a highly import-dependent clean energy deployment strategy, while raising energy costs, including to support domestic manufacturing or subsidize technologies, is equally politically challenging.

The renewable energy industry seems to offer opportunities to meet energy and economic development goals, but is there evidence that this promise has come to fruition? If there is, how did policymakers help deliver those results for their countries? This paper focuses on solar PV and wind industries in China, Germany, India, Japan, and the United States and provides a historical cross-country analysis, drawing from individual country cases, which aims to:

Determine which policies have been introduced to support the broader value chain—research and development(R&D), manufacturing, installation, and power generation—of the solar PV and wind industries in each country;
Track the trends in industry development in terms of size, installed capacity, jobs created (where available), and equipment prices (where available); and
Analyze how countries are finding success in both creating a healthy domestic industry and delivering low-cost, domestic clean energy.

This working paper emerges from a collaboration of five leading research institutions: World Resources Institute(WRI), Institute for Global Environmental Strategies(IGES), Öko Institut, Renmin University of China, and The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), based in the target countries. Researchers at each institution reviewed and gathered information from domestic and international data sources to create a richly nuanced but still comparable review of the development of these industries.

The assessment attempts to uncover in particular how policymakers have cultivated successes. Countries have pursued a range of policies to accomplish these goals and there is now sufficient history in the solar PV and wind industries to begin to draw conclusions about whether countries have met their goals and what policy steps have been effective along the way.

Open Climate Network Analysis

Kevin Lustig — Thu, 17 May 2012 12:16:37 -0400

Topic: japan

The Japanese Fast-Start Finance Contribution

Executive Summary

Delivering on the Clean Energy Economy: The Role of Policy in Developing Successful Domestic Solar and Wind Industries

Executive Summary

Data Explorer Tool

Open Climate Network Analysis

Use the list to the right to explore available analysis from the Open Climate Network »