WRI Stories Feed: Open Climate Network

Open Climate Network Partners Track Climate Policy Progress Around the World

Jennifer Hatch — Tue, 11 Oct 2011 10:54:39 -0400

The Open Climate Network recently concluded a three-day workshop in which participants from 18 organizations in 13 countries gathered to refine methodologies for the network’s first national assessment report, expected next year. The report will…

Open Climate Network Launches Website to Track National Progress on Climate Change

Taryn Fransen — Fri, 09 Sep 2011 10:26:38 -0400

Welcome to the Open Climate Network website, a platform for updates and analysis on country actions on climate mitigation and the provision of climate finance. Here you will find information on the latest policy developments in our…

United Kingdom Adopts Ambitious Climate Change Target

Jennifer Morgan — Tue, 17 May 2011 14:00:29 -0400

Today, the government of the United Kingdom took a significant step to shift to a low-carbon economy, providing clear signals to investors that the UK wants to host large-scale clean energy projects moving forward.

The agreement announced today takes the form of a legally binding target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 50 percent below 1990 levels by 2025, as part of the country’s fourth carbon budget. The agreement of the country’s conservative and liberal democrat parties extends current targets and continues the country on an aggressive reduction path from 2023-2027.

This move sends a signal to the international community that action on climate is a priority for the economy as well as the environment. As Chris Huhne, Energy and Climate Change Secretary said in announcing the target:

It will establish our competitive advantage in the most rapidly growing sectors of the world economy, generate jobs and export opportunities in these sectors, maintain energy security and protect our economy from oil price volatility.

Studies have shown that clean energy investments thrive where there is stable policy support, and setting targets is a critical first step.

The agreement was informed by the Committee on Climate Change, which calls for 80 percent reduction from 1990 levels by 2050, a recommendation that is in line with what most scientists suggest is necessary to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.

While the target is aggressive, in 2014 it will be reviewed against the European Union’s emissions trajectory and the government could adjust the target if the country’s reductions are more aggressive than those in the rest of the EU. To achieve the target, policymakers both within the UK and in the EU will have to develop realistic policies that can facilitate the transition to low-carbon energy.

NEWS RELEASE: Independent Global Network Launched to Track Countries' Climate Change Progress

Jessica Forres — Mon, 06 Dec 2010 14:58:01 -0500

Open Climate Network (OCN), a global network that will track countries’ progress toward cutting emissions and providing climate finance, was launched this week at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Cancun, Mexico. Led by the World Resources Institute (WRI), OCN convenes independent research institutes around the world to provide consistent and peer-reviewed information on major economies’ actions on climate change.

“Major economies have made high-level commitments to tackle climate change, but it has been difficult to access information about their progress that is consistent and trusted at the international level,” said Jennifer Morgan, director of the Climate and Energy Program at WRI. “OCN fills this gap by tapping the world’s leading research institutes to develop a highly credible source of information about countries’ progress.”

The network is expected to complement official reporting systems – an ongoing source of tension in the UNFCCC negotiations – by improving consistency for key topics, such as climate financing, and drawing on national experts to shed light on what is working, what isn’t, and why.

“Understanding where others are going is absolutely vital – that mutual trust is fundamental,” said Lord Nicholas Stern, speaking at the OCN launch on December 4. “What is happening under the OCN will complement the official line,” he continued, referring to the national communications and inventories prepared under the UNFCCC.

OCN is now developing a consistent framework for tracking progress on mitigation and financing. “Getting the metrics right is the first step,” said Taryn Fransen, who manages OCN at WRI. “By tracking the right information, we’ll not only be able to monitor progress, but also help stakeholders design more effective policies.” The network will then develop national profiles and implement an extensive review process before publishing the first assessments in late 2011.

To date, OCN partners include Australia’s Climate Institute, Canada’s Pembina Institute, China’s Renmin and Tsinghua Universities, Denmark’s CONCITO, France’s Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI), Germany’s Oeko Institute (which will also provide information on the European Union), India’s The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), Japan’s Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Mexico’s Mario Molina Center, and Norway’s Zero Emission Resource Organisation. WRI will serve as the Secretariat and the point organization for the United States, and is exploring additional partnerships in the UK, Brazil, South Africa, and elsewhere.

For more information about Open Climate Network, please visit http://www.wri.org/project/open-climate-network.

A Climate of Corruption? Transparency Challenges for Cancun and Beyond

Manish Bapna — Mon, 29 Nov 2010 16:29:27 -0500

An update from the International Anti-Corruption Conference.

At the start of the international climate conference in Cancun, the international anti-corruption movement is weighing into the debate on how to shape a new global treaty and deliver effective climate financing to developing countries.

Issues of transparency and accountability have long been a source of contention, and a barrier to progress, in the UN-led climate negotiations. Disagreement between developed and developing countries over how to make actions and policies taken by countries robust and comparable has undermined the trust essential for effective global cooperation to halt rising temperatures. More recently, the issue of climate financing has become a bone of contention, with developing countries questioning whether the money pledged by industrialized countries is new, or simply diverted development aid.

Last month in Bangkok, Transparency International organized the 14th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), which focused in part on the the transparency and corruption challenges associated with climate policy, climate finance for mitigation and adaptation, and carbon markets. WRI prepared the IACC background document on climate change and corruption and has been advising Transparency International on the 2010 Global Corruption Report, which also take climate change and corruption as its theme.

WRI Resources on Climate Finance

In a plenary presentation, WRI’s executive vice-president, Manish Bapna, focused on transparency in adaptation. He highlighted the “significant corruption and governance risks at each stage of funding for climate adaptation – how it is generated, how it is managed, and how it is spent.” Bapna highlighted the following specific questions and issues for policymakers to grapple with:

Transparency and accountability in the generation of adaptation finance.

With $30 billion pledged for climate finance for 2010-2012 and about $100 billion annually by 2020 (a figure comparable to total Official Development Assistance (ODA) today), making sure that these flows are corruption-free will be a massive challenge. Greater transparency on whether these funds are “new and additional” and a “balanced” amount is being allocated to adaptation will be crucial to creating trust between rich and poor countries.

Corruption and governance risks related to who should manage adaptation finance

Should adaptation financing be entrusted to multilateral and bilateral aid agencies such as the World Bank (what rich countries want) or should national institutions in developing countries have direct access to these funds? Rich countries argue that many of the new institutions created in developing countries lack the fiduciary controls and safeguards that, however flawed, have been tried and tested in the multilateral banks. Poor countries argue that adaptation finance is fundamentally different from development aid and should not be channeled in the same way.

New corruption risks related to how adaptation funding is spent

Sectors that will receive significant adaptation money include water, infrastructure and disaster relief. Yet all these have typically been characterized by high levels of corruption.
Corruption pressures are likely to pull funding to projects that are large and concrete-heavy (such as new infrastructure). This is the opposite of the small, local and flexible solutions often needed to deal with climate impacts.

Bapna concluded by calling for collaboration between the anti-corruption and environmental communities to help make emerging adaptation funds in developing countries more robust and corruption-proof. Efforts should include working with adaptation institutions in developing countries to make their governance and operations more transparent and inclusive as well as with civil society organizations to build their capacity to hold these institutions to account.

In a related IACC conference workshop, WRI’s electricity governance (EGI) team focused on how to address pervasive corruption in the capital-intensive electricity sector. Kickbacks to government officials to secure contracts for building new power plants or providing fuel or equipment are common, and clean energy technology markets are also not immune to fraud or corruption. These conflicts of interests can affect power development plans that shape a country’s energy choices. The workshop showcased innovative strategies to fight corruption in a sector that has historically received little attention from civil society, yet is at the center of sustainable development and climate change efforts. Speakers from EGI civil society partner organizations shared experiences from four different countries: Thailand, India, Indonesia, and South Africa.

EGI will soon compile a compendium of these examples and other emerging strategies and challenges that will be available on its website: http://electricitygovernance.wri.org

From Copenhagen to Cancun: Forests and REDD+

Florence Daviet — Tue, 23 Nov 2010 14:47:07 -0500

An update on the role of forests and REDD+ in the international climate negotiations.

Background on REDD

Deforestation and forest degradation threaten the global climate system by removing one of the planet’s essential absorbers and storehouses of carbon. Currently, forest loss is thought to contribute between 12-17 percent of annual global greenhouse gas emissions. The United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations offer Parties an opportunity to better recognize forests’ contribution to the global climate system and to protect them both for mitigation and adaptation purposes. Parties can do this in part by creating a system for positive incentives to developing countries who take actions to reduce emissions from forest loss and degradation and increase carbon storage (known as “REDD+”).

From Copenhagen to Cancun covers the key issues in the ongoing international climate negotiations. The series looks at where things stand after the 2009 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in Copenhagen and how discussions progress towards COP-16 in Cancun.

How this will be accomplished, however, is much more complicated. It requires figuring out what the rules would be, how efforts would be funded, and how success would be defined and measured. In Cancun, negotiators will need to make several decisions to clarify rules around safeguards, finance, the scope of REDD+ and methodological issues.

REDD+ in 2010

The outcome of the last major UNFCCC meeting in Copenhagen was a heads-of-state-negotiated “Copenhagen Accord,” a non-binding political statement outlining principles to keep global warming to 2 degrees Celsius. The Accord noted the important role of REDD+, building on the political support that has been stated in several different meetings since the Bali Conference of the Parties in 2007.

Prior to the development of the Accord, however, negotiators in Copenhagen worked on a much more detailed REDD+ language (the “REDD+ decision text”) which they hoped the parties would adopt to further guide the development of actions for REDD+.

Since the Copenhagen negotiations, countries have reopened the REDD+ decision text, and some of the changes proposed may be significant, such as which activities to include in the REDD+ framework. Nevertheless, a REDD+ decision in Cancun is still being put forward as one of the most likely outcomes of the conference of the Parties (COP) in Cancun.

The details that will be agreed on, however, will depend on whether the Chair of overall negotiations (AWG-LCA) decides to only have one balanced text, or would allow the additional REDD+ decision text to be included as an annex.

REDD + in Cancun: Key Discussion Points

Assuming that a more complete REDD+ decision moves forward in Cancun, a number of important elements of the text need to be finalized and agreed to in Cancun decision, including:

Clarity around Safeguards
One important task for negotiators would be to agree to and clarify the rules around safeguards, even if only at a high level. Social and environmental safeguards ensure the reductions from reduced deforestation and degradation are undertaken in a socially responsible and environmentally sound way. For instance, for any mechanism to be effective, it is essential that the communities (particularly indigenous communities) that rely on the forests for their livelihoods are brought into the decision-making process, and that transparent and effective governance structures are in place to help achieve this.

Social and environmental safeguards for REDD+ were discussed at length before and during Copenhagen negotiations, but some final points need to be agreed on. Among the questions that need to be answered include:

Will developing countries be supported to put the processes and procedures in place to ensure that safeguards will be met?
Will recognition and support of REDD actions taken only occur if countries can demonstrate that safeguards were met?
How will developed countries be recognized for the finance they have provided to put in place such systems?

These questions were left open in the REDD+ text after Copenhagen, although some of the language put forward in subsequent meetings start to more clearly link safeguards to actions and finance.¹

The question of whether and how countries providing and receiving financing for REDD+ activities will be held accountable for the safeguards is still unknown. Many are looking to non-UNFCCC multilateral initiatives like the UN-REDD Programme and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility for guidance on this issue.

Clear language agreed in a REDD+ decision defining safeguards would help donors and multi-lateral programs answer these questions appropriately. Furthermore, clarifying rules around safeguards will help implement REDD+ activities and coordinate financial commitments.

REDD+ Finance
To date the discussions around REDD+ finance have mostly centered on the type of finance (markets or funds) to be used for REDD+ activities. In the Copenhagen decision text on REDD+, finance is mentioned only briefly and simply states all the options.

While some more specific language has come up in negotiations since Copenhagen – including a proposal that REDD+ activities not be financed through a carbon market approach – further thinking about what language to include on finance in an agreement is needed.

In the context of the broader negotiations, finance discussions have centered on creating a fund for all climate activities. Yet to date, REDD+ negotiators have not put forward language for how REDD+ finance – if included in such a fund – would be managed and what activities would be prioritized. For example, they might wish to provide principles around the distribution of finance between different REDD+ phases currently in the text.

As decisions are made in Cancun, negotiators will need to figure out if REDD+ finance questions are being handled within the finance text regarding the fund or if there are details needed in the REDD+ text.

Defining the Scope of REDD+
The type of activities recognized as part of a REDD+ decision is still in flux. The REDD+ decision text from Copenhagen includes references to:

Reducing emissions from deforestation;
Reducing emissions from forest degradation;
Conservation of forest carbon stocks;
Sustainable management of forests;
Enhancement of forest carbon stocks;

The Accord, however, only mentions the first three. In subsequent negotiations on the REDD+ decision, countries have proposed still other configurations, such as the first and the fourth. In order to clarify which activities will receive compensation, the definition of what constitutes REDD+ will need to be made consistent in the UN process.

Giving SBSTA a Mandate
Regardless of whether one or all of the issues above are addressed in Cancun, one of the most important actions from a decision in Cancun would be to give the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) a mandate to continue to do more research on REDD+ methodologies. Through a mandate in the decision text, SBSTA could start the work identified in Copenhagen including:

identifying the drivers of deforestation
ensuring the effective engagement of indigenous peoples and local communities in monitoring and reporting
examining other methodological issues related to quantifying emissions and emission reductions for REDD+
considering how activities taken in Phase 1 and 2 should be tracked and recognized as part of the REDD+ framework.

In addressing these key issues in Cancun, negotiators will be one step closer to reducing emissions from forest activities in a meaningful way.

See the language added in Option 1: projects that “allow industrial scale logging or that involve conversion of natural forests to plantations or other commercial or infrastructure activities and projects that damage the environment or violate the rights of local communities;” would not be considered for financing (pg 53). ↩

Will Climate Finance Mean a New Path for the World Bank?

Athena Ballesteros — Mon, 17 May 2010 16:37:05 -0400

The World Bank must systematically address issues of environmental and social sustainability in its mainstream investments.

This post originally appeared on the World Bank blog “Development in a Changing Climate.”

In Copenhagen, donor countries pledged to raise US$30 billion in “fast start funds” and an additional US$100 billion a year by 2020 to invest in reducing emissions and adapting to the impacts of climate change. Though the commitments are clear, the delivery is uncertain. By the June UNFCCC meetings in Bonn, countries will need to start drafting a set of decisions on the financial architecture to manage and distribute these climate funds.

By embarking on several climate change initiatives, including an assessment of progress in implementing the Strategic Framework on Development and Climate Change (SFDCC) and the revision of its Energy Strategy, the World Bank has positioned itself to play a role in the management of new climate funds. The Bank already hosts several climate related trust funds, including the Climate Investment Funds. It is the trustee of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and its largest implementing agency. The question is whether the Bank should be entrusted with an even larger role in the future of climate finance. If it is going to gain the political support necessary to make this happen, the World Bank must systematically address issues of environmental and social sustainability in its mainstream investments.

Poverty Eradication and Low Carbon Development

The Bank must overcome the mindset that there are inevitable tradeoffs between addressing climate change and facilitating pro-poor development. In fact, the best route to poverty eradication is low carbon development.

The main challenge for the Bank will be to respond to the needs of developing countries while still promoting scalable investments in low carbon development. In order to do this, the Bank must overcome the mindset that there are inevitable tradeoffs between addressing climate change (and other environmental challenges) and facilitating pro-poor development. In fact, the best route to poverty eradication is low carbon development. Fortunately, there are numerous project and policy interventions that provide synergies between the low-carbon and the development agendas. Helping countries capture those synergies should be the guiding principle of the Bank’s climate work and its future energy sector strategy.

The ongoing energy strategy review offers the Bank a major opportunity to demonstrate leadership and a commitment to change. In 2008, WRI research showed that 60% of financing for the energy sector did not take climate change into account. Also, in 2010 the World Resources Institute released another survey that shows only a limited number of World Bank and other MDB (electricity sector only) loans consistently support sustainable energy investments in developing countries. The Bank now says that 60% of its country assistance strategies consider climate change. Does this signal real change?

A Greater Voice for Developing Countries?

The second challenge will be for the World Bank to embrace changes in its governance structures and procedures in order to give a greater voice to developing countries. This should be done in a manner that ensures efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, but more importantly result in better environment and development outcomes. The key principles to guide the Bank should be:

Recognition of common but differentiated responsibilities between countries, taking into account national circumstances and the needs of those who are most vulnerable.
Country ownership of plans that are rooted in development objectives. These plans should be developed with the participation of civil society and non-state actors.
Provision of incremental financing and technology and financial support to help developing countries leapfrog into low carbon or zero carbon trajectories.

The ability to balance climate change and sustainability objectives with poverty and development objectives is no mean feat. With greater power comes responsibility and developing countries need to demonstrate equal support to climate-friendly approaches. Several are already starting to do a significant part of their share in addressing climate change and are in fact willing to cover part of the costs. A new approach is perhaps overdue in that we explore more ways of “blending” various forms of financing, such as multilateral, bilateral, private, and trust fund monies, in order to help meet the incremental financing required for countries to transition towards low carbon development.

From Copenhagen To Cancun: Forests and REDD

Florence Daviet — Mon, 17 May 2010 15:30:53 -0400

An update on the role of forests and REDD in the international climate negotiations.

Note: This post has been updated. Read the most recent version here.

Background on REDD

Deforestation and forest degradation threaten the global climate system by removing one of the planet’s essential absorbers and storehouses of carbon. Currently, forest loss is thought to contribute between 12-17 percent of annual global greenhouse gas emissions. The United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations offer an opportunity to better recognize and protect forests’ contribution to the global climate system. It can do this in part by providing positive incentives to developing countries who take actions to reduce emissions from forest loss and degradation (known as “REDD”).

How this will be accomplished, however, is much more complicated. It requires figuring out what the rules would be, how efforts would be funded, and how success would be defined and measured. In Copenhagen, negotiators and heads of state made progress on the REDD+ issue, but ensuring this system goes forward will require further action throughout 2010.

REDD + in Copenhagen

The outcome of December’s climate meeting was a heads-of-state-negotiated “Copenhagen Accord,” a non-binding political statement outlining principles to keep global warming to 2 degrees Celsius. The Accord notes:

“We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries”

This statement builds on the political support that has been stated in several different meetings since the Bali Conference of the Parties in 2007.

Prior to the development of the Accord, however, negotiators in Copenhagen worked on much more detailed REDD+ language (the REDD+ “decision text”) which they hoped the parties would adopt to further guide the REDD+ discussions. In this text, negotiators had fleshed out much more specific elements of a potential REDD+ decision.

Social and environmental safeguards were one of the main components of a REDD+ decision text discussed at length in Copenhagen – how to ensure the reductions from reduced deforestation and degradation are undertaken in a socially responsible and environmentally sound way. For instance, for any mechanism to be effective, it is essential that the communities (particularly indigenous communities) that rely on the forests for their livelihoods are brought into the decision-making process, and that transparent and effective governance structures are in place to help achieve this. Negotiators in Copenhagen came close to agreeing on language that would encourage this participation, a positive development.

Unanswered Questions on the Future of REDD

Still, there are some questions regarding safeguards that have not yet been fully resolved.

Accountability

The question of whether and how countries receiving financing for REDD+ activities will be held accountable for the safeguards is still unknown. Making sure these safeguards are “measurable, reportable and verifiable” (“MRV” – UN negotiations language that encourages accountability) is essential moving forward.

Deforestation in Madagascar. Photo credit: WRI

Developing countries will be charged with carrying out most of the REDD+ activities. To do this, many will need to build capacity, e.g. identifying the drivers of deforestation, collecting better forest and emissions data, and building transparent systems to track REDD+ financing. This capacity-building cannot take place without support from developed countries, and they will need to assure developing countries that this support will materialize. Tracking this support to ensure its delivery is also important.

Creating a REDD Goal

Many countries and civil society groups argue that a goal for REDD+ should be written into the preamble of the decision text, such as reducing emissions from deforestation by 50% by 2020. Such a statement would push both developing and developed countries to think more seriously about the resources that will need to be made available to achieve this goal – and define in a more concrete manner what success would look like. However, negotiators did not reach an agreement on this point and have left the discussion for a later date.

Scope: What Should REDD try to Achieve?

The type of activities recognized as part of a REDD+ decision is still in flux –varying depending on which elements of the text coming out of Copenhagen are considered. The REDD+ decision text includes references to:

Reducing emissions from deforestation;
Reducing emissions from forest degradation;
Conservation of forest carbon stocks;
Sustainable management of forest;
Enhancement of forest carbon stocks;

The Accord, however, only mentions the first three. In order to clarify which activities will receive compensation, the definition of what constitutes REDD+ will need to be made consistent in the UN process.

Financing REDD

Another open question concerns financing. The Copenhagen Accord, like the Bali Action Plan, states that there should be positive financial incentives for countries that take action to reduce deforestation and degradation. However, how countries would receive this money is still up in the air – this could be through a carbon market, a dedicated fund or something else. In the REDD+ decision text, this question is also left open.

Geographic Scale: National or Local?

A final unresolved issue is at what geographic scale REDD+ activities will be recognized. Most, if not all, negotiators seem to agree that ultimately REDD+ activities should occur at the national level to ensure that significant drivers of deforestation are being addressed and that efforts can be tracked in complete way.

Some argue, however, that there may be cases in which sub-national activities should also be considered, either as a gradual scaling up strategy or in cases where the national government has a significant hardship in managing forests in a given area. For example, some countries have expressed the need to exclude areas of forests – that is, they would not be held accountable for any deforestation, degradation, etc. – where the national government cannot safely enter those areas to address the question of REDD+, such as where logging operations are operated criminally. There are various ways to consider these issues and depending on the type of positive incentives developed, these questions may be answered differently.

Methodological Challenges

In addition to these questions, there continue to be significant methodological uncertainties in accounting for deforestation and degradation that need to be resolved moving forward. Negotiators sent text to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) in Copenhagen, which was passed as a decision of the parties. The gives SBSTA the mandate to do more work on REDD+ methodologies, including identifying the drivers of deforestation; ensuring the effective engagement of indigenous peoples and local communities in monitoring and reporting; as well other methodological issues related to quantifying emissions and emission reductions for REDD+. This is a good step forward. In addition, the REDD+ decision text also mentions further work for SBSTA that – if parties agreed to it – could be passed on for SBSTA to consider.

Moving ahead: Venues and Key Decisions in 2010

UNFCCC

Most countries hope that the high-level decisions on REDD+ will be made within the UNFCCC negotiations in order to guide the various pilot initiatives throughout the world.

Both negotiators’ and political leaders’ overall commitment to REDD+ issues in Copenhagen shows a willingness to continue the REDD+ discussions between now and Mexico. This is important considering that other issues will compete for negotiating space.

In general, most countries hope that the high-level decisions on REDD+ – e.g., on questions of safeguards and MRV– will be made within the UNFCCC negotiations, preferably in Cancun, in order to guide the various pilot initiatives throughout the world. Methodological issues also would be best resolved at this level, to ensure standardization and consistency. However, some have questioned how far the REDD+ discussions can go in Cancun absent progress on other contentious issues, such as finance, that determine how REDD+ will be implemented.

Non-UN Processes

Countries continue to discuss REDD+ and are working on REDD readiness on the assumption that parties will eventually agree to a REDD+ decision text in the UNFCCC. Many of these discussions and activities on REDD+, however, are happening in parallel to the UN process in programs like the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and Forest Investment Program, as well as other bilateral activities around the world. In addition, discussions about creating an interim political partnership among countries to formalize areas of agreement on REDD+ started in Paris in March and will continue in Oslo at the end of May. The partnership’s goals include sharing information and transparency about REDD+ activities and scaling up financing, in addition to reaffirming a commitment to a REDD+ mechanism.

These pilot programs and interim arrangements will not set the rules for REDD+, but they provide lessons learned and precedents that feed into the negotiations. Many stakeholders – generally civil society and governments – engage in these processes to ensure that good precedents are set on issues such as transparency, local community engagement, and indigenous rights, and to ensure that REDD+ progress is tracked.

These multilateral programs will meet throughout 2010 and will continue to inform the UNFCCC discussions.

From Copenhagen to Cancun: Adaptation

Heather McGray — Thu, 13 May 2010 08:16:40 -0400

An update on climate adaptation efforts in the international climate negotiations.

In the UNFCCC climate negotiations, “adaptation” refers to the changes communities and countries will need to make in order to prepare for and respond to the effects of a changing climate. These responses vary greatly, from increased flood protection, to new agricultural practices, to improved environmental monitoring, and entirely new water governance structures. Poor countries will need to adapt most of all, since limitations in their economic, technical, and human resources make them more vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change.

Finding ways to help countries adapt (and financing these efforts) is an essential role of the UNFCCC, but countries failed to reach a final agreement in Copenhagen. Action on adaptation will continue throughout the year – both within (i.e. the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund) and outside (e.g. the World Bank) of the UN climate negotiations. However, until an approach to adaptation is agreed upon under the UNFCCC, activities will lack a “north star” to guide and coordinate efforts.

The Negotiating Text on Adaptation: Dealing with Semantics

In Copenhagen, negotiators were very close to agreeing a text on adaptation. The negotiating text that was nearly finalized could have sped the flow of finance and other resources to support adaptation in vulnerable developing countries, and could have fostered a coordinated approach for using those resources. Unfortunately, the negotiations stalled on a range of fronts, and adaptation was among the components that stopped short of a completed text.

Until an approach to adaptation is agreed upon under the UNFCCC, activities will lack a “north star” to guide and coordinate efforts.

Like many of the issues under debate in Copenhagen, the adaptation debate dealt heavily in semantics. Generally, Annex I (developed) countries prefer to see the UNFCCC create an adaptation “framework” that supports and fosters collaboration, but which leaves the details of activities at the discretion of Parties. Meanwhile, non-Annex I (developing) countries insisted that negotiators create an adaptation “program,” not a “framework,” in order to clearly define what adaptation activities will be supported and where the funding will come from.

The semantic distinction between “framework” and “program” came to embody the lack of trust between developed and less developed countries-–-those who have the money do not trust their developing country partners to spend it wisely, while countries who need support do not trust their wealthier negotiating partners to deliver on their promises.

The Copenhagen Accord on Adaptation

The Accord represents a ‘mixed bag’ for adaptation, with some positive developments and some negative ones.

On the positive side, the text mentions adaptations prominently in several places, particularly with respect to climate finance, including the Copenhagen Green Fund that the Accord creates. The Copenhagen Accord is also the first global agreement to articulate a concrete, measurable goal for mitigation: keeping the global temperature rise under 2 degrees Celsius. This––together with an agreement to review progress under the Accord, review the goal, and consider shifting it to 1.5 degrees C)––represents an important win for adaptation. If, as is likely, science continues to show that the impacts associated with 2 degrees are so severe that people cannot adapt successfully, the Accord requires that the goal be adjusted.

On the negative side, the Accord refers to adaptation not only as a response to climate change, but also as a response to “the potential impacts of response measures.” “Response measures” are a relic of climate negotiations from the 1990s––a term promoted by oil-rich countries meaning that their transition to a low-carbon global economy (i.e., that uses less fossil fuels) would be supported along with vulnerable countries’ needs for adapting to climate change. The conflation of the impacts of climate change with the impacts of response measures tied the adaptation negotiations in knots for many years. Then, under the Bali Action Plan, response measures were integrated into emissions reduction (mitigation) discussions, while adaptation became its own “pillar” to be negotiated separately. The inclusion of ”response measures” in the adaptation portion of the Copenhagen Accord is a step backward, creating a negotiating space that oil-rich countries can exploit at the expense of the most vulnerable countries. As this meaning was likely not understood by many heads of state, it would be helpful if oil producing nations did not use it as an excuse to reopen a closed debate.

Conspicuously absent in the Copenhagen Accord is the creation of a mechanism for supporting adaptation akin to those created for technology and REDD-plus. This could be a signal that adaptation may get less attention under the Copenhagen Accord than other issues and is less of a priority for the Parties who led in the Copenhagen Accord negotiations.

More likely, however, negotiators were wise in not creating a new mechanism for adaptation, since one already exists—the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund. There also are two adaptation-specific funds under the Global Environment Facility. The Accord’s lack of a special adaptation mechanism probably will turn out to be positive, since it will not be competing for funds and attention with other adaptation funds under the UNFCCC.

Moving Forward on Adaptation

A decision on adaptation would help build goodwill and trust among Parties, which could have positive repercussions for other issues in the UNFCCC climate talks.

Near the end of the Copenhagen sessions, negotiators appeared to have settled their semantic differences and elected to create an adaptation “framework.” They also had produced a relatively clean draft decision text, which should provide a reasonable basis for negotiations over the next seven months. If they can finalize this text by the Cancun talks, the global community will have a new “north star” by which to steer toward a shared, climate-resilient future. Perhaps equally important, a decision on adaptation would help build goodwill and trust among Parties, which could have positive repercussions for other issues in the UNFCCC climate talks.

However, forward movement on adaptation is closely tied to finance. Developed countries made financial commitments in Copenhagen to support adaptation efforts and financing for other issues. The Cancun negotiations must send a clear signal about where this money will come from, how it will be administered, what it will be spent on, and how it will be accounted for. The hoped-for adaptation “framework” will help clarify spending priorities, but relevant decisions will also be made outside the adaptation talks, in the finance stream of the negotiations. Crafting a financial mechanism that works for adaptation will be critical for success in Cancun.

Adaptation Funds to Watch

With that goal in mind, the players to watch this year are the several global funds now implementing adaptation initiatives and positioning themselves to shape the UNFCCC’s finance decisions. Briefly, these are:

Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund: Funded through the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund is unique in having a governing board dominated by developing countries. It is pioneering “direct access” to finance for recipient countries, (i.e. without mediation of a UN agency), and will have distributed its initial grants before Cancun.
World Bank Pilot Program on Climate Resilience (PPCR): Funded by contributions from several wealthy countries, the PPCR is piloting new approaches to integrating adaptation into broader development decision-making. Some have criticized it as unjust because it calls for recipient countries to take loans to support adaptation—an activity forced upon them by the greenhouse gas pollution of wealthier nations.
Global Environment Facility (GEF): The GEF is the traditional repository for funds associated with the UNFCCC, and has been supporting adaptation projects for several years. However, recipient governments have expressed frustration with the slowness of the GEF, as well as the extent to which UN agencies hold the reins on its projects.

Each of these funds will bring new practical experiences to Cancun, and negotiators will have a chance to reflect on what seems to be working and what doesn’t. They may select one of these funds to lead on adaptation finance under the UNFCCC, they may craft their agreement to support all three of these institutions (among others), or they may apply the lessons of these funds in creating something entirely new.

Whichever route they choose, the challenge will be to craft a finance structure that has legitimacy in both the developed and developing worlds, and that accommodates the diverse, place-specific set of activities that will need support if adaptation is to succeed.

From Copenhagen to Cancun: Technology Transfer

Letha Tawney — Mon, 10 May 2010 09:36:56 -0400

An update on UNFCCC efforts to promote technology transfer between countries.

Note: This post has been updated. Read the most recent version here.

December’s UNFCCC climate negotiations were so fraught with disagreement that success stories seem rare. However, technology transfer was one area in which definitive progress was made in Copenhagen, progress that is likely to continue this year in the UNFCCC negotiations and other venues.

What is Technology Transfer?

In the context of climate change, “technology transfer” refers to how technologies that reduce greenhouse gases and aid climate adaptation efforts are developed and shared across borders. Developing countries will need more than finance to address climate change – they will need new technology for mitigation (emissions reductions), such as wind power, and new technologies for adaptation, such as flood control technologies and drought resistant strains of corn and wheat.

Because technology transfer will facilitate global emissions reductions, it is considered key to reaching a global agreement. The Bali Action Plan, a decision made at the UNFCCC meeting in 2007 to achieve a legally binding climate agreement, called for strengthened efforts to move technologies from developed to developing countries.

Progress in Copenhagen

In the early days of December’s negotiations, country representatives made progress on the technology transfer text. By the end of the first week, negotiators appeared close to agreeing that a new international mechanism for development and transfer of technology should be created. This mechanism would have two parts – an executive committee made up of politically appointed country representatives that would provide coordination, and a climate technology center made up of technical experts that could lead capacity-building in countries that need it. This carefully negotiated plan represented a smart compromise between the need for a political body to provide guidance and coordination and a more down-to-earth mechanism with technical experts than can implement solutions. Had the negotiations advanced further, this plan could have been brought to political leaders.

Heads of state arrived late in the second week and switched gears to drafting the Copenhagen Accord. The Accord acknowledged technology’s important role, stating:

“In order to enhance action on development and transfer of technology we decide to establish a Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology deployment and transfer in support of action on adaptation and mitigation that will be guided by a country-driven approach and be based on national circumstances and priorities.”

While the level of detail did not come close to what was in the negotiating text, this paragraph in the Copenhagen Accord did something that hadn’t been done before – it showed strong political support for an actual technology mechanism. However, details on how such a mechanism would be implemented remain to be seen.

Ironing Out the Details: Financing and Intellectual Property Rights

While the negotiations on technology were not a barrier to a successful global agreement, country representatives did disagree on some details. First, it was unclear how a financial mechanism (which was being negotiated separately) would mesh institutionally with the technology mechanism. Would the activities undertaken within the technology mechanism automatically be funded by the financial mechanism? Would the technology mechanism have the possibility to provide input for the financial mechanism’s funding decisions related to technologies?

The second sticking point involved intellectual property rights, such as patents and copyrights. Some countries felt that technologies, particularly those that help communities adapt to changing climates, must be shared freely, while others worried that without intellectual property rights protection and thus the potential to profit, the private sector will not invest in new innovations.

As countries begin to consider implementation of a mechanism, unresolved challenges will need to be sorted out either inside or outside the UNFCCC. Key questions that countries will need to think about include:

How will the financial mechanism address capacity building and joint research, and prioritize which technologies to support?
How can the non-financial aspects of technology transfer, such as making sure countries have the research capacity and supportive governance structures, effectively be addressed?
If there is significant movement on technology transfer occurring in multiple venues outside of the UNFCCC, how do we ensure a certain level of coordination?
How can the transfer of adaptation technologies and the transfer for emissions reduction technologies be addressed with equal attention?

Next Steps for Technology Sharing

Compared to many other areas of discussion in the formal UNFCCC negotiations, finalizing the technology part of an international agreement this year could be relatively easy. However, in order to finalize the technology text, negotiators will need more clarity on the outcome of the other negotiating areas, particularly on the financial mechanism. Before a UNFCCC mechanism can facilitate technology transfer flows, a lot of work will be needed to set up the mechanism, define roles and responsibilities, and secure funding.

In the meantime, implementation can move forward in a number of non-UNFCCC forums. The progress made in the negotiations and the high-level support outlined in the Copenhagen Accord could kick-start additional action on bilateral and mutlilateral technology cooperation agreements among countries that want to take early action. Several new and existing partnerships such as the Major Economies Forum, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, as well as bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs), can encourage capacity building and technology sharing now. One key meeting to watch is the Clean Energy Ministerial to be convened by Steven Chu in July, where the United States plans to announce a series of cooperative projects on technology transfer, such as harmonizing appliance efficiency standards among the largest markets.

These meetings could move technology transfer forward now when momentum is needed, and the lessons learned can be wrapped into an eventual UNFCCC agreement, supporting the formal climate negotiations process.

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