After falling behind other development organizations, the World Bank now has a chance to update its environmental and social safeguard policies.
Following the recommendations of an internal report, the World Bank has announced plans to overhaul its influential environmental and social safeguard policies. For over two decades, these safeguards have helped (with varying degrees of success) to minimize the harm that Bank-funded development projects have on local people and the natural environment. Until recently, the Bank’s safeguards also served as de-facto international standards for other development banks and governments. As a result, any reforms to the World Bank’s safeguards—whether progressive or regressive—will have far reaching global impacts.
Leading, then Following, on Sustainability
Although the World Bank was an early leader on environmental and social sustainability, it has fallen behind other development actors. For example, the World Bank’s 1991 indigenous peoples policy requires clients to create an “indigenous peoples development plan,” which gives people a voice in the future development path of their community. This has since become global best practice for governments and companies.
In 2004, in contrast, the World Bank slowed the advancement of indigenous peoples’ rights by creating a watered-down alternative to the international legal principle of “free, prior and informed consent.” The principle requires project developers to gain the consent of impacted indigenous communities before starting a project. The World Bank’s policy only requires developers to conduct “free, prior and informed consultations” with indigenous communities, stripping them of the right to control their traditional lands. Only since the UN General Assembly’s adoption in 2007 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has the more robust “consent” principle moved forward among governments and companies.
On September 14th, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) presented Safeguards and Sustainability Policies in a Changing World to the Bank’s Board of Directors. The IEG’s report calls for a Bank-wide update of safeguards to reflect the Bank’s current ways of doing business. Shortly thereafter, World Bank vice president Joachim von Amsberg announced that the Bank would update its safeguards over the course of the next two years. According to Mr. von Amsberg, “we have been, but no longer are the leaders in this area.”
On September 29th, World Bank Group president Robert Zoellick echoed this concern at a speech at Georgetown University, saying, “To date more attention has focused on financial risk than human risk. We need to redress that imbalance.”
Updating Safeguards for Changing Times
“To date more attention has focused on financial risk than human risk. We need to redress that imbalance.”
- World Bank Group president Robert Zoellick
The World Bank needs these revisions, the IEG report notes, because its portfolio has changed. The majority of the safeguards were formed when the Bank primarily financed specific development projects—such as roads or dams. Now the Bank provides most of its financial support to sector programs (e.g. agriculture) that link less directly to specific projects. The Bank-managed “development policy loans” and “climate investment funds,” for example, are two new investment models aimed at the programmatic level. Often, World Bank staff are not entirely aware of how these funds are used. These investments have expanded the World Bank’s impact on national-level reforms, but have limited its ability to monitor and mitigate actual environmental and social impacts on the ground.
Meanwhile, global sustainability crises—climate change, food and fuel shortages, and financial instability—have emerged that affect all development projects. The Bank created the safeguards before these issues rose to prominence.
Manish Bapna, WRI’s Managing Director, raised key challenges for the World Bank in his speech at the Bank’s launch of the IEG report. The Bank will face a choice, he said. Some borrowers have opposed safeguards for the increased costs they bring. The Bank can seek to please all of its borrowers, which will likely result in a “race to the bottom,” or it can use this opportunity to align its standards with international environmental and human rights norms. Most governments have already committed to these same norms in their negotiations outside the Bank.
Three issues that the Bank will need to address include:
1. Are safeguards the means or the ends?
At the launch event, Bank staff expressed multiple objectives for the safeguards review. Some believe that safeguards will naturally develop if the World Bank invests in broader environmental and social governance reforms. Others view safeguards as the immediate, minimal protections that the Bank should apply to avoid harmful impacts on people and ecosystems.
By focusing only on long-term governance reforms, the Bank could potentially allow short-term investments to go forward without adequate protections for people’s rights and ecosystems. Immediate protection of these rights should be top priority, but ideally will also help to spur longer-term governance reforms in a country.
2. How will the Bank measure clients’ success?
Traditionally, the World Bank has evaluated clients’ performance by requiring them to undertake a set of procedures, such as environmental impact assessments. In 2006, the International Finance Corporation (IFC)—the private sector financing arm of the World Bank Group—introduced a new approach. The IFC evaluates clients’ performance according to a set of (sometimes vaguely defined) outcomes, thus allowing clients more flexibility to choose their own procedures. This theoretically allows clients to choose the least-cost options and build their own capacity to manage environmental and social risks.
Some have argued that the World Bank should move towards the IFC’s approach. Nevertheless, as the IFC’s current policy review reveals, there need not be an either-or choice between two approaches. In many cases, clients and communities have benefited from a flexible approach. Yet in other cases, IFC clients, such as the Equator Principle private banks, have called for clearer standards and guidance. Too much discretion can increase costs and waste clients’ time. And while the World Bank’s approach can appear rigid, the use of well-defined procedures can provide local communities with a clear sense of their rights and what to expect from a project.
3. What is an effective way to resolve communities’ concerns?
As the World Bank devolves greater responsibility to borrowing governments, it should remain responsive to the concerns of communities affected by its investments. This can build local support for Bank-funded development projects, and also reduce the Bank’s reputational risks. The IEG report recommends that the World Bank create a grievance mechanism, which can respond quickly and cheaply to the concerns of affected communities. Yet the World Bank already has an independent mechanism—the Inspection Panel—that evaluates compliance with safeguards, and increasingly helps to mediate conflicts. Bank management has proposed that the grievance mechanism would best sit under management control.
A potential problem with this arrangement could be the lack of independence from Bank staff who may be involved in the conflict. A more effective option might be to strengthen the mediation role of the Inspection Panel. Before making this decision, the Bank should do a careful review of experiences of other multilateral development banks. The ultimate solution should not only seek to minimize costs for the Bank, but also to provide the most effective solutions for affected communities.
Conclusion: Beyond the Rhetoric of “Bureaucratic Hurdles”
The World Bank’s safeguards review will have ripple effects across the world—and will hopefully create an opportunity to strengthen global standards for environmental and social sustainability. But to regain its leadership in this area, the World Bank will need to ensure that the review is not just about overcoming bureaucratic hurdles and speeding transaction times. Instead it should aim to effectively manage risks, minimize harm to communities and resources, and create opportunities for the people affected by Bank investments.
The IEG report and Bank management’s response are available online at http://www.worldbank.org/oed.
Kim Thompson is a former consultant with WRI’s Institutions & Governance Program, and a co-author of A Roadmap for Integrating Human Rights into the World Bank Group.
Kirk Herbertson, AssociateKirk’s work focuses on the environmental and human rights aspects of international development projects.









2 Comments
Hello Kirk and Kim, thanks
Hello Kirk and Kim,
thanks for this update on WB safeguards. Apart from the issues you raise, in fairness, I think it should be also recognised that the Bank is taking on board quite a lot of the recommendations of the IEG, including on social issues, strenghtening monitoring and reporting requirements (though commitments on improvements of access to information are very limited).
I have a question though - I don't understand your point about the grievance mechanism and why a strenghtened inspection panel report would be preferable. It can take a long time before a case gets approved by the Inspection panel for further examination, where by default the whole project will be examined. It does sound to me that the logic of a separate grievance system that does not require approval of a caseby the IP makes sense, to ensure a wider reach to affected people.
How that grievance system is organised is another matter, realistically it may be hard to be completely independent, but it could be semi-independent with outside observers, reporting and access to information requirements etc? Is the Inspection Panel not an entirely different kind of organisation, that cannot really support issues of redress?
Your thoughts would be much appreciated!
Thanks.
Response to comment Thanks
Response to comment
Thanks for such thoughtful comments. You have provided a very valuable perspective that captures many of the discussions currently underway at the World Bank. We hope that readers of this article will also take your comments into consideration.
First, we absolutely agree with your point that the Bank has expressed a commitment to take on board many of the recommendations of the IEG. (For other readers, the management’s response to the report is available on the IEG’s website, http://www.worldbank.org/oed). The commitment has been made, but the reforms will take time. Over the next two years, Bank management will decide exactly how to strengthen attention to social issues, monitoring, reporting, and other points raised by the IEG. These issues cannot be examined in isolation, and will inevitably require systemic changes to the underlying structure of safeguards. We hope that our article can help the Bank to examine these underlying systemic issues from the onset.
On your question about the grievance mechanism, you also raise very valid points. Your rationale is very much in line with the reasons that Bank management has moved forward with plans to create a grievance mechanism that is separate from the Inspection Panel. Our main point in this article is that Bank management should not prejudge the design of such a grievance mechanism. Yes, we absolutely agree with your and IEG’s assessment that the Inspection Panel’s compliance function is not enough. There is also need for a grievance function to resolve problems quickly and satisfactorily for affected communities.
However, how should this grievance mechanism be designed? The arguments in our article are based on experience at other development banks—where a single, independent mechanism often has two functions (compliance and ombudsman). Any decisions at the World Bank on how to respond to grievances should be based on a careful evaluation of the experiences of other development banks. The Inspection Panel was the first of these mechanisms and needs to be updated to reflect current best practice. To its credit, the Inspection Panel has recognized this gap, and has explored ways to engage in “problem-solving” within the scope of its mandate (see Inspection Panel Newsletter, Issue 3, June 2010).
While we do not want to prejudge the outcomes of the Bank’s reforms, perhaps the ultimate solution will require more of a grievance “system” than a single grievance “mechanism.” Perhaps one option could include three layers of reforms: (1) at the national level, stronger guidance for borrowers on how to integrate their own grievance mechanisms into projects, and how to ensure that an integral part of each project’s design is to ensure that potentially affected communities will have effective access to justice; (2) at the Bank level, comprehensive training and procedures for World Bank country offices on how to respond to grievances effectively; and (3) an update of the Inspection Panel’s mandate to allow it to serve as an ombudsman for complex complaints (almost similar to an appellate court, except that communities would have the option to go directly to the Panel when they feel other options have been exhausted).
The ultimate goal of this process is to ensure that affected communities have effective access to justice. By keeping that end in mind, we are confident that the Bank will find an appropriate way forward.