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An Updated Response to EEI’s Timeline of Environmental Regulations

Kevin Lustig — Mon, 21 May 2012 10:16:48 -0400

This fact sheet updates the analysis done in our earlier response to EEI’s timeline of environmental regulations.

EPA remains on track in issuing rules that provide a path to a cleaner power fleet.

After years of delay, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is working to reduce dangerous and toxic pollutants released to the air and water by electric power plants, as required by the Clean Air Act (CAA) and other statutes. Four key points about EPA’s actions are clear:

Clarifying EEI’s Timeline

Figure 1: Edison Electric Institute’s Timeline of Environmental Regulatory Requirements for the Utility Industry (Click to enlarge)

Figure 2: Modified Edison Electric Institute Timeline, Removing All But New Compliance Obligations (Click to enlarge)

Figure 3: Timeline of Actual Compliance Obligations for Electric Power Plants (Click to enlarge)

Contrary to assertions by industry groups, EPA is pursuing a realistic timeline over the next five to ten years to bring the electric power industry into compliance with the law.
In most cases, the electric power sector has been on notice for several years (in some cases several decades) that these pollutants would be regulated.
Without new regulations, these pollutants will continue to impair America’s waterways, heat the planet, perpetuate acid rain, and lead to preventable hospital visits and premature deaths.
In each of its rulemakings, EPA provides for an extensive, open, and evidence-based public process. This leads to more robust and fair rules for the electric power sector. As EPA finalizes each rule, it will establish an increasingly clear pathway for investments in an American electric generation fleet for the 21st century.

CEOs and other representatives of major electric power corporations have suggested that EPA’s regulatory timeline is unworkable. The largest industry trade group, the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), produced a slide in 2010 (updated in May 2011) that purports to display an onslaught of new requirements for power plants. EEI has distributed this slide (reproduced in Figure 1) widely on Capitol Hill, where it presumably hopes to win lawmakers’support for additional delays in EPA rules or even a stripping of EPA’s regulatory authority.

WRI has identified four categories of EPA activities on the EEI timeline that are potentially misleading. When these activities are removed, only the timing of actual new compliance obligations is left. In Figure 2, “X”s (color coded for each filter in the screening process) have been applied to remove events from EEI’s timeline that are not consequential from a compliance standpoint.

Rules that have been remanded or vacated by court decisions that do not impose compliance obligations.
Rules that were already in effect when EEI circulated its chart, representing compliance obligations that already exist; there are no new requirements imposed by these rules.
Public input through the rulemaking process (which leads to more robust and fair rules for the electric power sector, and should not be conflated with new compliance obligations).
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) rules for various pollutants that set standards for states to achieve. They do not establish new requirements for electric generation units.

The EPA regulatory process is far from a “train wreck.” EEI’s misleading timeline consists mostly of procedural events and activities that will not impose a direct compliance obligation on power plants. This serves only to spread confusion about EPA’s actual regulatory schedule.

Figure 3 shows a more accurate picture of the timeline for new requirements applicable to electric power plants.

EPA is carrying out the intent of Congress (through the passage of the bipartisan Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and subsequent amendments) to clean the nation’s air and water. These rules can help the United States transition to cleaner and more efficient power plants by establishing a clear pathway for investments in an electric generation fleet for the 21st century.

The CAA requires EPA and states to regulate and reduce harmful pollutants from major emissions sources, including power plants. To date, this framework has delivered substantial improvements in air quality and significant public health benefits estimated between $82 and $556 billion annually. Over the next decade, power plants will be subject to new rules under the CAA as well as the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to control substances that cause serious health problems and substantial damage to America’s natural resources. These rules will take effect after long lead times; in most cases industry has been on notice for years that these pollutants would be regulated.

Many of the regulations under consideration by EPA have been in the regulatory pipeline for over a decade. Due to administrative delays and litigation resulting in court decisions remanding or vacating previous rules, many of these rules have not been finalized or the final rules were reversed. In many cases Congress has set statutory deadlines for EPA to act, EPA has missed the deadlines, and courts have ordered EPA to act.

Download the complete fact sheet (includes additional figures, footnotes, and references) (PDF, 7 pages, 475 Kb)

Open Climate Network Analysis

Kevin Lustig — Thu, 17 May 2012 12:16:37 -0400

Use the list to the right to explore available analysis from the Open Climate Network »

The U.S. Fast-Start Finance Contribution

Kevin Lustig — Thu, 17 May 2012 11:54:20 -0400

Executive Summary

OpenClimateNetwork.org

Visit openclimatenetwork.org for the latest analysis, project info, expert perspectives and more.

Developed country governments have repeatedly committed to provide new and additional finance to help developing countries transition to low-carbon and climate-resilient growth. This assessment considers U.S. efforts to provide “fast start finance” (FSF) in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 in the context of the pledge by developed countries to mobilize $30 billion1 from 2010 to 2012 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is part of a series scrutinizing how developed countries are defining, delivering, and reporting FSF.

Given the size of its economy and its historic responsibility as a top emitter of greenhouse gases, the United States has a major role to play in delivering FSF. Key characteristics of the U.S. FSF contribution are quantified in Figure 1.

The U.S. FSF contribution of $5.1B reflects a positive effort made in challenging political and economic circumstances, but there is more to be done. Congress and key agencies have increased funding for climate change objectives relative to the pre-FSF period, and have begun to integrate climate considerations into ongoing portfolios. The global economic recession and the resulting pressure to cut spending, however, combined with an active subset of policy-makers who oppose U.S. action on climate change, have impeded further increases to climate finance.

The US does not count private finance toward its FSF contribution, but it does count non-grant instruments as well as development assistance. Loans, loan guarantees, and insurance constitute one-third of the U.S. contribution; grants and related instruments (including contracts and grant contributions to multilateral climate funds) account for the rest. Only a minority of the funds examined – 40% for adaptation and 29% for mitigation – support projects that clearly target climate change as a principal objective, although the remainder can in most cases still be expected to deliver climate benefits. (A greater share may principally target climate change, but adequate information was not available to support this conclusion.)

While the FSF contribution reflects some new effort to address climate change, it is unclear that the contribution as a whole can be considered “new and additional.” Since the start of the FSF period, the United States has substantially increased international finance that explicitly targets climate change. Some U.S. government agencies have also begun integrating climate change into aspects of development assistance and development finance. The United States is also counting as FSF projects and programs that it was funding – and that were likely delivering climate benefits – prior to the FSF period. Furthermore, the United States has distanced itself from targets and timetables to increase development assistance, and climate finance appears to be increasing at a significantly faster rate than development assistance.

There is a need for additional transparency and harmonization in reporting. The United States has made significant efforts over the past several years to improve monitoring and reporting on climate finance, as well as on foreign assistance. However, there is room for improvement.

We recommend that the United States:

Publish the criteria it uses to program and identify FSF.
Publish a detailed list of the projects and programs that constitute FSF, including, for each project, the amount, the administering agency, the financial instrument, the recipient country (where relevant) and institution, whether it is supported by core or non-core climate finance, and, to the extent feasible,information on disbursement status.
Identify and explain any discrepancies between such a project list and the total reported FSF sum, and explain how non-grant instruments are counted.
Provide complete information on U.S. FSF in a single document, so that users can avoid the need to download and reconcile over 240 documents to access this information.
Harmonize reporting between the FSF reports and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) by ensuring that relevant FSF projects are tagged with the appropriate DAC Rio Markers and using consistent project titles between the two reporting systems.
Work in cooperation with other contributor countries and multilateral institutions to strengthen and harmonize bilateral and multilateral reporting on climate finance.

The UK Fast-Start Finance Contribution

Kevin Lustig — Thu, 17 May 2012 11:21:25 -0400

Executive Summary

OpenClimateNetwork.org

Visit openclimatenetwork.org for the latest analysis, project info, expert perspectives and more.

Developed country governments have repeatedly committed to provide new and additional finance to help developing countries transition to low-carbon and climate-resilient growth. This assessment considers UK efforts to provide “fast start finance” (FSF) in 2010/11 and 2011/12 in the context of the pledge by developed countries to mobilise funds approaching USD 30 billion from 2010 to 2012 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is part of a series of studies scrutinising how developed countries are defining, delivering, and reporting FSF.

The UK has a major role to play in delivering FSF. It is one of the richer economies in the developed world. Like other developed countries, it bears historic responsibility for contributing to the global accumulation of greenhouse gases. Key characteristics of the UK FSF contribution are quantified in Figure 1.

The UK has made a substantial effort to mobilise climate finance. Finance has been channelled through the Environmental Transformation Fund in 2010/11 and through the International Climate Fund (ICF) in 2011/12. GBP 1.06 billion had been spent and committed as of November 2011. It has also committed climate finance beyond the FSF period through the International Climate Fund (ICF), which will spend GBP 2.9 billion between April 2011 and March 2015.

The majority of UK finance is spent by multilateral institutions, in the form of capital contributions. UK contributions of GBP 715 million to the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) administered by the World Bank in partnership with Regional Development Banks constitute the largest share of its FSF.

*The UK does not count private finance toward its FSF contribution, but it does count non-grant instruments as well as development assistance.** The majority of the projects supported do seem to have climate change as a principal objective.

While the FSF contribution reflects some new effort to address climate change, it is unclear that the contribution as a whole can be considered “new and additional.” Since the start of the FSF period, the UK has substantially increased international finance that explicitly targets climate change. The UK is also counting as FSF projects and programmes that it was funding – and that were likely delivering climate benefits – prior to the FSF period. Much of the funding counted was pledged prior to the FSF period, notably the contributions to the CIFs and Congo Basin Forest Fund. Climate finance appears to be increasing at a significantly faster rate than development assistance.

The UK is relatively transparent about its FSF spend, but more can be done. The UK discloses a list of projects and programmes to which FSF has been directed to interested stakeholders, and to the European Commission (EC) on an annual basis. The UK’s adoption of new transparency standards for its administrative processes is substantially strengthening its performance in this regard. Specifically, it participates in the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) for its official development assistance (ODA) spending. In this context, government departments are now required to disclose the business case for all projects that receive public support. A business case presents the key components and purpose of the programme, and how it contributes to the achievement of relevant government UK strategic objectives. This includes relatively comprehensive information on the institutions receiving funding and implementing projects.

There is a need to improve access to information in practice. The commitment to disclose business cases was made in January 2011 and has not been applied retroactively. In practice, few business cases have yet been made available. We do note some discrepancies between aggregate and project-level reporting, although we recognise that the project list is a snapshot at a given moment in time of the collection of FSF recipients. As new systems to improve reporting and disclosure on the status of programmes funded by the UK government are implemented, we should expect to see higher levels of transparency realised in practice.

We recommend that the UK:

Disclose underpinning project-level spending information alongside aggregate reporting
Ensure that project lists consistently specify the recipient institution for finance to reduce discrepancies and enhance transparency
Work in cooperation with other donors and multilateral institutions to strengthen and harmonise reporting on climate finance, particularly with regards to the status of disbursement
Ensure that business cases for approved projects are publicly disclosed in a timely manner by all ICF implementing departments

Building International Climate Cooperation: Lessons from the Weapons and Trade Regimes for Achieving International Climate Goals

Kevin Lustig — Fri, 04 May 2012 15:42:34 -0400

About this Report

Watch

A conversation about the report with author Ruth Greenspan Bell and Jennifer Morgan, Director, Climate and Energy Program

Tackling global climate change requires countries across the world to engage in multigenerational cooperation (referred to herein as “collective action”) to advance a transition to a near-zero-carbon economy by 2050, in order to keep global average temperature increase below 1.5–2 degrees Celsius in comparison with preindustrial levels. No one country can achieve the necessary emissions reductions alone. If we are to succeed, there must be sustained political engagement across countries to solve difficult conflicts, such as the level of effort versus cost, or equity versus environmental rigor. Issues where agreement is needed include:

Targets, timetables, and actions for reduction—who does what, by when, and how?
Common standards for measuring emissions—what standards, who uses them, and when?
Robust mechanisms to verify the implementation of national actions—what, who, when, and how?

What might negotiators in the third decade of building collective action to address climate change learn from the experience of negotiators who manage other problems that by their nature require global action? This report contributes to this question by examining two such negotiating areas where considerable experience has been gained in devising agreements and institutions. The first is control of weapons of mass destruction, a field relatively unknown in the climate change world. The second, multinational economic arrangements, is more familiar ground but an area that warrants deeper examination. Although such arrangements have not “solved” weapons or economic challenges, notable progress has been made since the middle of the 20th century, and thus these arrangements offer valuable insights for climate negotiators.

Fact Sheet: U.S. Electricity Markets Increasingly Favor Alternatives to Coal

Kevin Lustig — Mon, 23 Apr 2012 15:20:35 -0400

The U.S. electric power system is gradually shifting toward cleaner forms of generation. One sign of this transition is the declining use of coal for electric power production.

In 2011, use of coal for U.S. power generation dropped to its lowest level in more than a decade, according to the federal government’s independent U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). In fact, the EIA reported1 earlier in 2012 that coal’s share of total U.S. electric power generation dropped below 40% for the last two months of 2011, the lowest level since 1978.

To understand the cause of this decline, it is important to examine contributing market forces. Doing so provides important context for recent coal plant retirement announcements, particularly given that some companies have attributed retirements to EPA rules that are still years away from going into force. For example, FirstEnergy Corp. announced in late January 20122 that it would retire several of its smaller coal-fired power plants, explaining that the decision was “based on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), which were recently finalized, and other environmental regulations.” FirstEnergy, however, had previously cited a range of reasons3 for its decision to reduce operations at many of its smaller coal plants.

Furthermore, available evidence does not support the notion that regulations are the primary driver behind recent coal plant retirement announcements. These business decisions4 are heavily influenced by such market forces as lower natural gas prices, declining growth in electricity demand, rising coal prices, and increased cost-competitiveness of renewables.

Download the fact sheet to keep reading and see full citations.

How to Identify Degraded Land for Sustainable Palm Oil in Indonesia

Maggie Barron — Tue, 10 Apr 2012 12:57:57 -0400

Summary

Palm oil production in Indonesia has the potential to generate local benefits if oil palm cultivation expansion follows sustainable planning and management practices, including respect for local interests and rights. Potential benefits include increased incomes, profits, and government revenues, reduced poverty, and improved natural resource management. Whether this potential is achieved will depend on how new areas for oil palm cultivation are identified.

This working paper demonstrates how to implement a quick and cost-effective method for identifying potentially suitable areas for oil palm cultivation. The method is designed in accordance with established standards for sustainable palm oil production, such as those of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO); incorporates relevant Indonesian laws and policies; and is consistent with proposed national REDD+ strategies to support palm oil production on low carbon degraded land. The method consists of a desktop analysis using readily available data and rapid field assessments. It is based on a set of indicators related to selected environmental, economic, social, and legal considerations.

This method can be used by companies as a first step in a site selection process for a certified sustainable plantation and can inform government officials and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in assessing land use policy options to support the expansion of sustainable palm oil production on degraded land. However, since it is designed primarily to rapidly identify the highest priority areas for further investigation, it should not be used to predetermine where oil palm cultivation expansion should occur.

Using this method as a first step in a site selection process can reduce the costs of implementing the additional due diligence activities required to confirm the suitability of a potential site for oil palm cultivation. These activities, which are outside the scope of this paper, include community mapping to document community claims and rights, conducting high conservation value (HCV) and social impact assessments, implementing a comprehensive free prior and informed consent (FPIC) process, and fulfilling legal requirements.

The World Resources Institute (WRI) and Sekala applied this method to identify nine potentially suitable areas in the Indonesian province of West Kalimantan for a pilot sustainable palm oil project under Project POTICO. These nine sites were identified through targeted field assessments of high priority sites identified through the desktop analysis using project-specific criteria and do not represent all potentially suitable areas in the province.

The desktop analysis, the first step in this method, classified a total of approximately seven million hectares of land in the provinces of West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan as potentially suitable, using the best publicly available data at the time of publication.

This desktop analysis, associated data, and other supplemental materials will be made easily accessible on a “Suitability Mapper” application to be available on this website in mid-2012. The application will allow users to replicate the desktop portion of this analysis or generate their own suitability maps—using parameters of their choice—to guide their own targeted field assessments.

Promises Kept: Ensuring Ambition and Accountability through a Rio +20 “Compendium of Commitments”

Kevin Lustig — Thu, 29 Mar 2012 09:59:56 -0400

Introduction

In an effort to ensure that the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio +20) generates meaningful outcomes, governments and other stakeholders increasingly support using the Conference to announce specific and time-bound commitments, and to agree on a “framework” to hold each other accountable for results. This so-called “Compendium of Commitments” has been criticized as suggesting a “bottom up”, “pledge-and-review” approach that will lead to business-as-usual outcomes that don’t meet the sustainable development challenges ahead of us. In the few months remaining, proponents of the Compendium of Commitments will have to demonstrate that this approach will lead to ambitious actions and that the accountability framework is sufficiently robust to incentivize and track performance. Rio+20 participants can learn from the range of experiences with past pledge-and-review initiatives and focus on ways to improve the quality of the content of pledges and of the institutions and procedures designed to review them.

Background

Rio +20 takes place in the context of a wider debate on the future of multilateralism and on the role of international law and international institutions in addressing global environment and development challenges. The 1992 Rio Earth Summit generated a variety of internationally agreed guidance and principles (Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development), spurred the adoption of three major, binding multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) (the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)).

The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) focused on “implementation and compliance” rather than the development of new binding rules and obligations. To this end, it provided a platform for announcing “public private partnerships,” negotiated “bottom up” among interested parties (Brack 2000; Speth 2002; WRI 2004). But few of the more than 300 partnerships launched at WSSD have survived and the vast majority never resulted in significant change, due, at least in part, to the lack of any meaningful process for monitoring and review of performance.

The international climate change negotiations have, until recently, marked a similar trend away from “top down” treaty obligations contained in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, towards “pledges” proposed by each party in the 2010 Cancun Agreements. Others suggest that the more recent (2011) agreement by climate negotiators in Durban to aim towards a “protocol, another legal instrument or an outcome with legal force” means that an interest in negotiated, binding commitments remains. They also point to recent international agreement on new binding protocols to the CBD, and progress on a treaty to reduce mercury emissions.

In any case, it has been clear from the onset of the current negotiations that this Rio process is unlikely to lead to a new set of legally binding treaties. Until recently, it has, however, been unclear what alternative form of outcome would justify holding a global conference on sustainable development at time of heightened concern about the future of the planet.

Yet there is some promise in the concept of pledges. Paragraph 128 of “The Future We Want - Zero Draft of the Outcome Document” states:

We welcome the voluntary commitments made at Rio+20 and invite the Secretary-General to compile them in a registry/compendium that will serve as an accountability framework.

A process that invites participants to come forward with “voluntary commitments”, rather than negotiating them collectively, raises a set of design challenges that will confront proponents of a compendium in Rio:

How do we ensure a common level of quality of commitments to be specific, time-bound, measurable, and ambitious beyond business as usual?
How do we ensure that commitments related to challenges requiring collective action, involving transboundary pollution, damage to the global commons, equitable access to scarce resources, are ambitious enough, in the aggregate, to make the needed difference?
How do we ensure that commitments that address fundamental rights and basic needs, such as information, participation and justice, and clean water, food, shelter, and health, are ambitious enough to respect individual human dignity?
How do we ensure that, in the absences of the force of law, there is an accountability framework robust enough to hold participants accountable to their constituencies and to each other to fulfill their commitments?

Getting Ready: A Review of the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Readiness Preparation Proposals

admin — Fri, 23 Mar 2012 10:43:01 -0400

The World Bank administered Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD Programme) are two leading multilateral efforts currently supporting developing countries to become ―ready‖ to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and enhance carbon stocks (REDD+).

This working paper is the eighth in a series of regular updates reviewing the Readiness Preparation Proposals (R-PPs) submitted by REDD+ Country Participants to the FCPF and the National Programme Documents (NPDs) submitted by UN-REDD Programme countries to the UN-REDD Programme. The analysis is based on a desktop review of each R-PP and NPD in order to understand how countries are considering fundamental issues of forest governance during the readiness phase. We assess whether the documents identify major governance challenges contributing to forest loss, and whether principles of transparency, accountability, participation, and coordination are being applied in the development of REDD+ institutions, systems, and plans.

The 7th meeting of the UN REDD Programme Policy Board and the 10th meeting of the FCPF Participants Committee will be held in Berlin, Germany, from 13-14 October and 17-19 October, respectively. This paper evaluates R-PPs from Central African Republic and Colombia submitted for formal consideration by the FCPF Participants Committee. Draft R-PPs from Guatemala and Mozambique were submitted for informal review, but are not analyzed in this paper. We also review Nigeria’s NPD, which will be considered for funding by the Policy Board.

Insights from the Field: Forests for Water

Kevin Lustig — Wed, 29 Feb 2012 10:56:29 -0500

Summary

In the Neuse River Basin in North Carolina, WRI is working with partners to identify beneficiaries and their water-related dependencies. We learned that clear documentation of the risks that beneficiaries face from water pollution, drought, and watershed degradation will help jump-start their participation in emerging PWS programs.
In the Sebago Lake Watershed in Maine, WRI is finalizing a methodology for “green-gray” analysis that will provide beneficiaries a way to identify cost-effective green infrastructure solutions to water infrastructure demands of the 21st century. Green infrastructure comprises all natural, seminatural and artificial networks of multifunctional ecological systems within, around, and between urban areas at all spatial scales. We learned that, to convince public investment managers to invest in green rather than gray, it is important to make the financial and business case using the same basic methodologies that are used for calculating the costs and benefits of conventional gray approaches.
WRI is also working to develop PWS programs that help the city of Raleigh meet streetscape, conservation development, tree conservation, storm water management, and water quality goals contained in its Unified Development Ordinance in a least cost manner. We learned that market-based solutions like PWS can play a large role in land-use planning processes and that these processes may represent a large untapped demand driver for PWS programs throughout the South.