WRI Publications Feed: All

Creating a Sustainable Food Future, Installment Two: Reducing Food Loss and Waste

Sarah Parsons — Tue, 04 Jun 2013 16:11:56 -0400

Summary

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that 32 percent of all food produced in the world was lost or wasted in 2009. This estimate is based on weight. When converted into calories, global food loss and waste amounts to approximately 24 percent of all food produced. Essentially, one out of every four food calories intended for people is not ultimately consumed by them.

Food loss and waste have many negative economic and environmental impacts. Economically, they represent a wasted investment that can reduce farmers’ incomes and increase consumers’ expenses. Environmentally, food loss and waste inflict a host of impacts, including unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions and inefficiently used water and land, which in turn can lead to diminished natural ecosystems and the services they provide.

Big inefficiencies suggest big savings opportunities. We estimate that if the current rate of food loss and waste were cut in half―from 24 percent to 12 percent―by the year 2050, the world would need about 1,314 trillion kilocalories (kcal) less food per year than it would in the business-as-usual global food requirements scenario described in The Great Balancing Act, the first installment of this World Resources Report working paper series. That savings–1,314 trillion kcal–is roughly 22 percent of the 6,000 trillion kcal per year gap between food available today and that needed in 2050. Thus, reducing food loss and waste could be one of the leading global strategies for achieving a sustainable food future.

In this paper, we profile a subset of approaches to reducing food loss and waste that experts suggest are particularly practical and cost-effective, that could be implemented relatively quickly, and that could achieve quick gains. We also recommend a number of cross-cutting strategies to further galvanize commitment to reducing food loss and waste.

Reducing Food Loss and Waste is the second in a series of working papers that we’ll roll out over the course of a year. Each subsequent paper will take a detailed look at a potential solution that could help achieve a sustainable food future. These installments will set the foundation for and culminate in the World Resources Report 2013-2014: Creating a Sustainable Food Future. To learn more about the series and sign up to receive updates, visit the World Resources Report website.

Creating a Sustainable Food Future, Installment One: The Great Balancing Act

Sarah Parsons — Wed, 29 May 2013 14:15:01 -0400

Summary

How can the world feed more than 9 billion people by 2050 in a manner that advances economic development and reduces pressure on the environment? This is one of the paramount questions the world faces over the next four decades.

Answering it requires a “great balancing act” of three needs—each of which must be met simultaneously.

First, the world needs to close the gap between the amount of food available today and the amount required in 2050. According to new WRI analysis, we’ll need about 60 percent more food calories in 2050 than in 2006 if global demand continues on its current trajectory. This gap is in part a function of increasing population and wealth. The United Nations projects that the global population will likely grow from 7 billion in 2012 to 9.3 billion by 2050. At least 3 billion more people are likely to enter the global middle class by 2030, and they will almost certainly demand more resource-intensive foods like meat and vegetable oils. At the same time, approximately 870 million of the world’s poorest people remain undernourished even today.
Second, the world needs agriculture to contribute to inclusive economic and social development. Agriculture employs more than 2 billion people around the world—more than 28 percent of the global population. And according to the World Bank, growth in the agricultural sector can reduce poverty more effectively than growth arising from other economic sectors. We need a strong agricultural sector if the world is to develop in a way that reduces poverty, alleviates hunger, generates revenue and jobs, and benefits women.
Third, the world needs to reduce agriculture’s impact on the environment. For instance, agriculture was responsible for approximately 24 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 and therefore contributes to climate change. Agriculture is the dominant driver of tropical deforestation. Furthermore, agriculture accounts for about 70 percent of all the freshwater withdrawn from rivers, lakes, and aquifers.

There is no silver bullet to accomplishing the great balancing act. But there are potential solutions. When combined effectively, these solutions could close the food gap, contribute to global development, and reduce food’s environmental impact.

In The Great Balancing Act, we propose a “menu” of these potential solutions. Some menu items reduce projected growth in consumption, such as decreasing food loss and waste. Other menu items increase food production, such as restoring degraded lands back into agricultural productivity. No item on the menu can achieve a sustainable food future by itself, and the relevance of items will vary between countries and food chains. But the combination of solutions should help feed the world while contributing to poverty reduction, gender equity, ecosystem conservation, greenhouse gas emission reductions, and sustainable freshwater management.

The Great Balancing Act is the first in a series of working papers that we’ll roll out over the course of a year. Each subsequent paper will take a detailed look at a potential solution that could help achieve a sustainable food future. These installments will set the foundation for and culminate in the World Resources Report 2013-2014: Creating a Sustainable Food Future. To learn more about the series and sign up to receive updates, visit the World Resources Report website.

Watch a narrated slideshow introducing The Great Balancing Act, or view our powerpoint presentation.

The German Fast-Start Finance Contribution

Sarah Parsons — Thu, 09 May 2013 16:27:15 -0400

Summary

Industrialized countries have repeatedly committed to provide new and additional finance to help developing countries transition to low-carbon and climate-resilient growth. This assessment addresses German efforts to provide “fast start finance” (FSF) as a contribution to the pledge by developed countries to provide USD 30 billion from 2010 to 2012 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is part of a series of studies scrutinizing how developed countries are defining, delivering, and reporting FSF.

Germany has increased climate finance in recent years and met its self-defined FSF pledge. According to the government’s FSF reporting, from 2010-2012 Germany provided a total of EUR 1.29 billion (approximately USD 1.7 billion) for climate action in developing countries that was counted towards FSF. Germany has therefore slightly exceeded its FSF pledge for the period 2010-2012. Even before the start of the FSF period, Germany was already providing significant funding for climate change-related activities in developing countries, particularly for renewable energy and energy efficiency. It therefore started from a relatively high climate finance baseline. Moreover, FSF is only a part of what the German government provides in climate-related finance for developing countries. Overall, Germany has increased delivery of international climate finance when compared to climate-related spending prior to the FSF period: In 2011, Germany committed about EUR 1.8 billion in total for climate finance, an increase from EUR 470 million in 2005.

Germany’s FSF is roughly evenly distributed be¬tween bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Out of the EUR 1.29 billion, EUR 585 million was channelled through multilateral funds. The largest single channel is the World Bank-administered Climate Technology Fund (CTF), which received EUR 375 million from Germany from 2010-2012. Substantial amounts of funding were also transferred to adaptation-related multilateral funds and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Two federal ministries, the German Federal Ministry Economic Coop¬eration and Development (BMZ), and the German Federal Ministry Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), are responsible for the disbursement of FSF resources. Nearly half of this funding has been channelled through the German development cooperation agencies GIZ and KfW. Relatively few resources were delivered directly to developing country domestic institutions.

Germany FSF has primarily supported general mitigation (45 percent), and efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation (26 percent), while 28 percent supports adaptation. Germany aimed to provide 50 percent of its climate finance for mitigation, 33 percent for adaptation activities, and 27 percent (EUR 350 million) for REDD+. The Copenhagen Accord sought a balance between adap¬tation and mitigation (including REDD+) during the FSF period. Adaptation has received less finance than expected at the outset of the FSF period. Overall, most German FSF resources have been allocated to the regions of Africa (34 percent) and Asia (29 percent). Additionally, roughly 60 percent of all adaptation finance and 50 percent of bilateral adaptation finance has been allocated to Small Island Developing States, Least Developed Countries, and African countries.

The majority of Germany’s FSF is provided through grants. Loans are provided to the CTF, and account for about 29 percent of the overall FSF contribution. Germany is relatively transparent about its FSF. Through BMU and BMZ, the German government publishes lists of the FSF projects it supports, reporting on the recipient country, project name, project description, objective, amount, implementing agency, financial instrument, and expected project duration. It also reports to the European Commission (EC) on an annual basis. In addition, Germany has commissioned a study on lessons learned from FSF for long-term finance. However, official reporting would be strengthened through the inclusion of information on the actual disbursements and on project impact.

Germany is one of the few countries which has applied and published a specific definition of “new and additional” for its FSF. Germany only counts those funds towards FSF which were committed in addition to a 2009 baseline (as part of Official Development Assistance, or ODA, spending) and/or which are generated by new financing sources, namely the auctioning revenues under the EU ETS. Nonetheless, some of the financial resources counted as FSF were pledged before the FSF period: for example, Germany pledged finance to the CIFs in 2008, but only funding delivered from 2010 onwards was counted as FSF. All German FSF is counted towards ODA. However, Germany has yet to meet its commitment to provide 0.7 percent of its Gross National Income as ODA, and in fact its ODA contributions have recently declined. Also, Germany’s climate finance is committed in the context of a complementary commitment to scale up finance for biodiversity under the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). It will be important to monitor reporting against both of these commitments in order to understand whether pledges have been duplicated or recycled.

Most of the projects counted towards FSF seem to have a principal or at least significant climate objective. An independent application of the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) climate markers to the FSF projects suggests that the vast majority of projects seems to have a clear climate element, based on limited project informaiton. However, a focus on only bilateral projects reveals that the share of principally climate-driven projects may be lower than bilateral projects committed to other climate objectives. Furthermore, an assessment of the incremental climate change costs that are covered through the projects is not available.

Germany is one of the few developed countries to have committed climate finance beyond the FSF period. At COP18, Germany pledged to deliver EUR 1.8 billion in climate finance in 2013, an increase from the EUR 1.4 billion delivered in 2012.1 These funds will come from the general budget and from the “Sondervermögen Energie und Klimafonds” (“Special Energy and Climate Fund”). This separate budget structure is financed by auctioning revenues from the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The current low prices of carbon, however, may reduce available climate finance beyond 2012.

With regard to reporting on international climate finance, we suggest the following actions to further in¬crease transparency:

Continue to publish annual, project-level information after the close of the FSF period. Reporting systems could be updated to reflect the parameters of the new United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) common reporting format (for example, by specifying the sectors to which funding is directed). It could also seek to improve reporting on the actual state of implementation of projects, and actual disbursement of committed funds. Therefore, Germany may explore practical options for providing some project-level information on the results of at least the larger programs funded in real time, e.g on the basis of the project reporting that is required of implementers (such as through annual or evaluation reports).
Provide additional information on which projects are funded by which ministries.
Provide more detailed financial information on projects that meet commitments to increase both climate and biodiversity finance to provide greater clarity on synergies, and assure that finance has not been double-counted. Such reporting can also be related to climate finance reporting under the OECD climate markers, in order to ensure consistency with FSF reporting.
Further strengthen and harmonize reporting and transparency standards for implementing institutions, in particular dedicated multilateral climate funds. Ger¬many can support progress to this end as a member of the governing bodies of these funds.

With regard to Germany’s international climate finance approach as a whole, we offer the following recommendations:

Continue to work to increase support for adaptation, with the goal of achieving a greater balance between adaptation and mitigation.
Explore ways to work more closely with recipient country-based institutions through its delivery of climate finance. This may need to be accompanied by capacity building support in order to increase these countries’ capacity to access such funding and use it effectively.
Explore options to ensure that increasing climate finance as part of efforts to deliver ODA does not reduce support available to help countries address development challenges as a whole. In the German case, the fact that ODA has been declining while climate finance increases at a relatively rapid rate presents a particular challenge.
Consider options to find more reliable sources of climate finance. The German climate finance approach has been largely sourced through the revenues from emission-trading. Nevertheless, there is a need for all countries to further scale-up climate finance in order to meet agreed goals of mobilising USD 100 billion from a mix of public and private sources by 2020. Options might include multilateral efforts to strengthen the EU ETS through increased EU mitigation targets, as well as the deployment of other innovative sources, such as financial transaction taxes or revenues from international transport. A clear pathway for scaling up climate finance would help create greater predictability of finance, and help generate trust and ambition in developing countries.

Environmental and Social Policies in Overseas Investments: Progress and Challenges in China

Sarah Parsons — Wed, 08 May 2013 16:57:41 -0400

Summary

Like other countries that invest overseas, China—through the projects it finances and executes—can bring great benefit to the countries and communities in which it invests (“host countries”). However, investments can pose challenges and risks to host and investor countries. Effectively tailored environmental and social policies can identify and mitigate not only unanticipated environmental and social harm, but also some of the investment risks that can undermine the long-term financial success of a project.

Even in the midst of the 2008–09 global financial crisis, China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) continued to grow.1 Between 2008 and 2009, China’s OFDI flows grew nearly 8 percent, while total world OFDI flows during the same period decreased nearly 40 percent (Unctad Stat 2012). In both 2009 and 2010, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank together lent more than the World Bank did to developing countries (Dyer, Anderlini and Sender 2011).

Environmental and Social Policies in Overseas Investments: Progress and Challenges for China examines trends in China’s overseas investments and considers how social and environmental policies can reduce investment risks and enhance the positive impacts of China’s OFDI. We focus on three major forces in China’s OFDI: the central government, financial institutions, and centrally owned state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Although a variety of institutions are involved in overseas investments, the majority of Chinese OFDI originates from centrally owned SOEs, and its OFDI growth is fueled largely by the strong lending capacity of its financial institutions, especially the China Development Bank and the Export Import Bank of China. Aid, trade, and other types of financial interest that may be associated with overseas economic interests are not addressed here, nor are overseas investments by collectively or privately owned companies.

As China continues to expand overseas investments, understanding and managing the environmental and social impact of these investments in host countries can help it build mutually beneficial relation-ships with host countries. Already, methods to address environmental and social issues in overseas investments are emerging in China. Chinese regulatory authorities are creating guidelines in their areas of jurisdiction, and individual financial institutions are developing and refining their own policies. International experience with environmental and social risk mitigation offers a useful context for Chinese investors and policymakers to consider as they continue to develop these overseas investment policies.

Moving forward, China faces several challenges, not the least of which is a lack of understanding of the regulatory and legal environment in host countries. Attention to host countries’ regulatory and legal environments must be ratcheted up if investment risks are to be reduced. Supervisory challenges and coordination among ministries should also be prioritized. Finally, even though governments, financial institutions, and corporations have produced multiple guidelines and policies to guide more sustainable overseas investments, implementation remains a major challenge. Sufficient resources should be directed toward implementation to overcome barriers such as cost, coordination of resources, and time.

While these challenges are real, China’s rapid economic growth and global presence also create opportunities that offer insight for a global audience. China can shape the direction and return of its OFDI to maximize positive impact and achieve “win-win” relationships with host countries. As an experienced recipient of OFDI, China can now apply those lessons as it invests abroad. In addition, China can step into facilitator and leadership roles in the international agenda of promoting sustainable cross-border investment, especially in developing countries.

This issue brief is the first in a series of WRI publications by the International Financial Flows and the Environment (IFFE) project that examine the role of environmental and social policies in overseas investments. Future publications will look at the “business case” for adopting stronger environmental and social policies, and will include case studies of overseas investments from China and other countries.

The U.S. Contribution to Fast-Start Finance: FY12 Update

Sarah Parsons — Tue, 23 Apr 2013 14:06:17 -0400

Summary

As part of the international climate negotiations, developed country governments committed to provide developing countries with “new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions, approaching $30 billion in the period 2010-2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation.” This fact sheet considers U.S. efforts to provide “fast-start finance” (FSF) over the full three-year period, drawing primarily from program data presented in the State Department’s report series, “Meeting the Fast Start Commitment.” The fact sheet is part of a series of analyses on FSF contributions, and updates a May 2012 working paper quantifying total U.S. contributions to the global FSF commitment.

Over the FSF period, the United States has reported roughly $7.5 billion, or about 20% of the global self-reported total flows of FSF. Notable attributes of the U.S. FSF contribution include:

The levels of finance fluctuated over the three-year period, with the largest volume in FY11. This is related to variations in spending on the part of key agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).
Over the three-year period, a significant share of the U.S. portfolio supported clean energy in Asia. OPIC and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) played key roles in administering finance, and finance was channeled via a combination of grants and loans, guarantees, and insurance.

Transparency has improved in FY12 reporting, but there is room for further improvement. In addition to implementing the new international reporting requirements adopted at Doha, the following actions would help support verification of aggregate figures, as well as coordination and accountability:

Publishing a detailed, disaggregated, annual list of projects and programs;
Using the Foreign Assistance Dashboard as a platform for sharing information;
Aligning reporting under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with reporting to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); and
Continuing to work with other countries and multilateral institutions to strengthen and harmonize reporting systems.

Putting the Pieces Together for Good Governance of REDD+: An Analysis of 32 REDD+ Country Readiness Proposals

Sarah Parsons — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 14:05:45 -0400

Executive Summary

Developing countries are receiving new financial and technical support to design and implement programs that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degrada¬tion (referred to as REDD+). Reducing emissions from forest cover change requires transparent, accountable, inclusive, and coordinated systems and institutions to govern REDD+ programs. Two multilateral initiatives— the World Bank-administered Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the United Nations Collaborative Pro¬gramme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries (UN-REDD Programme)—are supporting REDD+ countries to become “ready” for REDD+ by preparing initial strategy proposals, developing institutions to manage REDD+ programs, and building capacity to implement REDD+ activities.

This paper reviews 32 REDD+ readiness proposals sub¬mitted to these initiatives to understand overall trends in how eight elements of readiness (referred to in this paper as readiness needs) are being understood and prioritized globally. Specifically, we assess whether the readiness proposals (i) identify the eight readiness needs as relevant for REDD+, (ii) discuss challenges and options for addressing each need, and (iii) identify next steps to be implemented in relation to each need. Our analysis found that the readiness proposals make important commit¬ments to developing effective, equitable, and well-governed REDD+ programs. However, in many of the proposals these general statements have not yet been translated into clear next steps.

Key Findings:

Discussions of stakeholder participation, non-carbon monitoring, and cross-sectoral coordination are the strongest in terms of the number of readiness proposals that identify issues as relevant for REDD+, discuss key challenges and options, and propose clear next steps (e.g., studies, processes, institutional support costs).
Few REDD+ countries consider specific design op¬tions or challenges related to REDD+ benefit sharing, conflict resolution, or revenue management systems, although most include plans to address these issues as readiness activities move forward.
Relatively few readiness proposals identify specific next steps to address land tenure challenges or estab¬lish mechanisms to coordinate with local institutions during REDD+ planning and implementation.
Cross-cutting issues such as vertical coordination of REDD+ programs and coherence of proposed new REDD+ bodies with existing forest sector institutions have not been explicitly considered in most readiness proposals to date.

Delivering on the commitments made in the readiness proposals will be crucial to building stakeholder confidence and scaling up financial support for REDD+ programs. We make three recommendations that can help countries make short-term progress on REDD+ objectives and ultimately develop effective and equitable REDD+ programs:

REDD+ countries, donors, and civil society stakehold¬ers should consider gaps identified by our analysis and work to ensure that readiness activities promote comprehensive and integrated approaches to designing REDD+ strategies, systems, and institutions.
REDD+ countries should improve efforts to prioritize and sequence readiness activities to enhance transpar¬ency on how readiness financing is allocated to differ¬ent readiness needs.
REDD+ countries should develop transparent and ac¬countable domestic systems for tracking progress on readiness activities to ensure that readiness proposal commitments to well-governed REDD+ programs are carried out in practice.

China's Overseas Investments in the Wind and Solar Industries: Trends and Drivers

Sarah Parsons — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 17:00:58 -0400

Executive Summary

Shifting to a low-carbon economy will require current emitting countries and projected future emitters to rapidly scale up their investments in renewable energy. In recent years, major emerging economies like China, India, and Brazil have been catching up with leading developed country investors in Europe and the United States. By some estimates, China is already the leading global investor in renewable energy infrastructure, and is increasing its overseas investments in renewable energy, particularly solar and wind. If China achieves its goal of sourcing 15 percent of its energy mix from renewables by 2020 and 30–45 percent by 2050, renewable energy will become closer to a mainstream energy resource within the country. Cost reduction incurred in this process would benefit not only China, but also the rest of the world.

This working paper aims to help policymakers, investors, and researchers better understand the trends in China’s overseas investments in the wind and solar industries, and the factors behind those trends. It examines the scale, nature, and types of China’s overseas investments in the wind and solar industries, and identifies the policy and market factors that drive these investments. China has made at least 124 investments in solar and wind industries in 33 countries over the past decade. Of the investments for which data were available, the cumulative value amounted to nearly US$40 billion in 54 investments, and the cumulative installed capacity added was nearly 6,000 MW in 53 investments. Of the 124 investments, 41 were in the wind industry, 81 in the solar industry, and 2 in both the wind and solar industries.

The majority of investments were in electricity generation. Twenty-seven of the wind investments were in wind farms predominantly carried out through joint ventures, as were most of the 41 solar investments. Several investments were made in manufacturing facilities and to establish sales and marketing offices. Most of the investments were concentrated in a few developed countries: the United States, Germany, Italy, and Australia. A handful of developing countries, including South Africa, Pakistan, and Ethiopia, also attracted investments.

China’s investments in the wind and solar industries are driven by a multitude of factors including macroeconomic conditions; industry conditions; policies (both general and specific to the wind and solar industries) that “push” Chinese companies to invest overseas; policy incentives in host countries that “pull” Chinese investors; and financial support from Chinese banks that “enables” these investments.

China is driven to seek solar and wind markets overseas largely because its manufacturing capacity exceeds domestic demand. The Chinese government’s policy support and financial support—mainly from state-owned banks that respond to government policy—encourage this overseas investment trend. Host countries’ policies have also attracted investments from China’s solar and wind industries, either advertently through tax breaks, feed-in tariffs, or bilateral cooperation agreements, or inadvertently as a “side-effect” of policies discouraging imports.

Although the analysis in this working paper points to interesting trends and provides useful insights that enhance our understanding of China’s role as an overseas investor in the wind and solar industries, it is limited by a paucity of information. Beyond the data collected for the 124 investments, the authors also reviewed literature and carried out interviews to deepen the analysis. The analysis is confined to a subset of the renewable energy sector rather than the full range of possible low-carbon investments. The inadequacy of the data does not allow an analysis of the emissions impact of these investments. These limitations suggest areas for further research that could help improve an understanding of China’s potential to reduce emissions beyond its borders, and would allow policy analysis on how China could increase this positive impact, particularly in developing countries.

Striking the Balance: Ownership and Accountability in Social and Environmental Safeguards

Sarah Parsons — Thu, 11 Apr 2013 15:05:46 -0400

Executive Summary

Many governments around the world have put in place systems to help ensure that investments in changes such as infrastructure projects, government programs or new national laws do not bring undue harm to their citizens or environment. The effectiveness of these systems in successfully preventing negative impacts varies widely. Developing countries tend to have a particularly difficult time ensuring that investments within their borders meet minimum social and environmental standards. As a result, many financial institutions have established their own policies to help ensure that their investments do not result in harm to vulnerable communities or ecosystems. These policies are generally known as “safeguards.” Although safeguard policies provide vital protection against risks to people and the environment, properly designing and implementing these policies means navigating complex relationships between financial institutions, governments, and the citizens of recipient countries.

The World Bank (the Bank) has been at the forefront among multilateral development banks in developing safeguard policies. In recent decades, the Bank has experimented with different approaches to social and environmental protection. These approaches respond in part to variations in the way in which countries receive money from the Bank, such as investments in projects versus policies. They have also emerged in reaction to the changing global landscape. Some developing countries have become richer and created stronger systems to protect people and the environment. The global community has also realized the value of letting developing countries define their own development path. At the same time, the pressing need to protect our global common goods and most vulnerable communities has become more apparent.

This working paper seeks to help the Bank and other financial institutions take stock of experiences to date and distill lessons for the future. We look at four different approaches to protecting against social and environmental harm: the traditional safeguards approach, which applies to most project lending; the Use of Country Systems approach, which the Bank has applied to some project lending on a pilot basis; the approach used for Program for Results investments, which applies to the Bank’s results-based lending pilot; and the approach used for Development Policy Loans, which applies to loans that support changes to policies and institutions.

While all four of these approaches rely on the rules and institutions of the recipient country, they do so to different degrees. Through an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each of approach, we arrive at seven lessons for the World Bank and other financial institutions looking to balance ownership and accountabil¬ity in their social and environmental policies:

Building on country safeguard systems can enhance ownership and incentives for safeguard implementation.
Minimum standards and positive incentives can clarify requirements and encourage countries to strive toward more ambitious social and environmental goals.
Safeguard implementation requires anticipating risks, planning to deal with those risks, managing and monitoring implementation, and responding to harm.
Proper safeguard implementation requires people on the ground to engage, collaborate and problem solve.
Recipient country safeguard systems still need support.
Citizens play a key role in any effective safeguard system.
To successfully balance ownership and accountability, safeguard approaches need to recognize differences among countries, sectors, and projects.

Clearing the Air: Reducing Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions from U.S. Natural Gas Systems

Sarah Parsons — Wed, 03 Apr 2013 17:48:29 -0400

Key Findings

Fugitive methane emissions from natural gas systems represent a significant source of global warming pollution in the U.S. Reductions in methane emissions are urgently needed as part of the broader effort to slow the rate of global temperature rise.
Cutting methane leakage rates from natural gas systems to less than 1 percent of total production would ensure that the climate impacts of natural gas are lower than coal or diesel fuel over any time horizon. This goal can be achieved by reducing emissions by one-half to two-thirds below current levels through the widespread use of proven, cost-effective technologies.
Fugitive methane emissions occur at every stage of the natural gas life cycle; however, the total amount of leakage is unclear. More comprehensive and current direct emissions measurements are needed from this regionally diverse and rapidly expanding energy sector.
Recent standards from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will substantially reduce leakage from natural gas systems, but to help slow the rate of global warming and improve air quality, further action by states and EPA should directly address fugitive methane from new and existing wells and equipment.
Federal rules building on existing Clean Air Act (CAA) authorities could provide an appropriate framework for reducing upstream methane emissions. This approach accounts for input by affected industries, while allowing flexibility for states to implement rules according to unique local circumstances.

Methodology and Database--Public Financing Instruments to Leverage Private Capital: Focus on Multilateral Agencies

Sarah Parsons — Tue, 12 Mar 2013 20:41:59 -0400

These documents are drawn from WRI’s working paper, Public Financing Instruments to Leverage Private Capital for Climate-Relevant Investment: Focus on Multilateral Agencies.

This working paper is part of WRI’s Climate Finance series, which tackles a broad range of issues relevant to public donors, intermediaries, and recipients of climate finance. A subset of this series examines how public funds can leverage private sector investment in climate-relevant projects to help meet developing countries’ significant investment needs.

Access other publications in this series.