WRI Publications Feed: Technology Transfer

CCS Demonstration in Developing Countries: Priorities for a Financing Mechanism for Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage

Maggie Barron — Mon, 04 Apr 2011 10:54:35 -0400

Executive Summary

Climate Change and CCS

In facing the challenge of mitigating global climate change, world leaders have acknowledged that no single solution exists, and therefore, a portfolio of carbon dioxide (CO2) reduction technologies and methods will be needed to successfully confront rising emissions. Due to their dependency on fossil fuels, the energy supply and industrial sectors are the greatest contributors to CO2 emissions, accounting for 25.9 percent and 19.4 percent of the total respectively.

In addition to efficiency improvements and enhancing clean energy use, one key option for limiting future CO2 emissions from fossil fuel energy use is carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS). CCS is a suite of technologies integrated to capture and transport CO2 from major point sources to a storage site where the CO2 is injected down wells and then permanently trapped in porous geological formations deep below the surface. Candidates for CCS technology include fossil fuel power plants; steel, cement, and fertilizer factories; and other industrial facilities.

CCS in Developing Countries

Despite often-aggressive programs to promote energy efficiency and deploy nuclear, renewable, and other low-carbon energy sources, many developing countries will still rely heavily on fossil fuel energy to power their development for decades to come. There is therefore a need for developing countries to create strategies that address fossil fuel emissions in a way that minimizes the costs of doing so, and consequently minimizes impacts to their national development goals.

CCS is currently the only near-commercial technology proven to directly disassociate CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use at scale. Its deployment could potentially allow developing countries to gradually shift away from fossil fuels for energy and industrial needs with relatively little disruption to their long-term development strategies. If deployed as an interim measure, it could allow time for other alternative low-carbon technologies to be developed and deployed, permitting fossil fuels to be gradually phased out. This strategy could assist developing countries to transition to a low-carbon economy in the next 15–50 years.

While CCS is potentially attractive to some developing countries, there has been limited development of demonstration projects in Africa, Asia, or Latin America due mainly to their high cost in the absence of expected profits or significant carbon financing. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates the total cost for a new average-sized coal-fired power plant that captures up to 90 percent of its CO2 emissions to be US$1 billion over 10 years.

Existing financing for CCS is grossly insufficient to enable demonstration projects in developing countries. The few available funds are either spread over the full array of low-carbon technologies, or fall short of the magnitude or the mandate needed to propel commercial-scale CCS demonstrations forward. Current carbon offset mechanisms are not sufficient to spur CCS deployment in developing countries in today’s context either. Overall, existing CCS financing mechanisms help grow capacity, but their support is insufficient to leverage enough funding from capital markets to implement projects in a non-OECD context.

The IEA CCS Roadmap proposes 50 CCS projects in developing countries in the next 10 to 20 years. As well as reducing the developing world’s greenhouse gas emissions, accelerating CCS demonstration efforts in non-OECD countries can likely also improve technologies, increase efficiency, reduce uncertainty and risk, and initiate learning-by-doing at a lower cost than would be possible in OECD countries. The captured benefits from doing so will be more significant the sooner acceleration in CCS development in developing countries begins.

About this Paper: Topics of Discussion for Financing CCS in Developing Countries

This paper seeks to promote the effective deployment of CCS demonstration projects in developing countries. Aimed at international policymakers and agencies engaged in CCS funding and deployment negotiations and discussions, the paper explores some of the key issues emerging around this critically important topic, and it presents a series of options and recommendations to international policymakers. WRI’s aim is to assist the initial design of an effective approach for financing CCS demonstration projects in developing countries over the next 10 years. Below is a summary of the key topics and options explored in the paper.

Topic 1: Aims of Financing CCS Demonstrations in Developing Countries

The main goal for developed countries to provide financing for early-stage CCS demonstrations in developing countries should be to support non-OECD countries in fulfilling their share in global climate change mitigation efforts.
A financing mechanism for CCS in developing countries should aim to foster tangible CO2 emission reductions through a clear focus on storage goals. The level of ambition for CO2 storage should support current CCS deployment requirements in developing countries. While it is impossible to objectively ascertain what proportion of this total a dedicated OECD country–funded CCS financing mechanism should support, it is evident that developing countries will need support for a significant share of these projects.
Implementing CCS demonstrations that lead to the storage of 45–60 million tons carbon dioxide (MtCO2) over 10 years could significantly spur the research and deployment rates needed for CCS development to take off in developing countries.

Topic 2: Eligible Costs for Financing

Most CCS demonstration projects will operate in conjunction with new or existing power plants or industrial facilities that may also function without the technology. Funding for CCS demonstrations can therefore be structured around whole projects—including the non-CCS components of the facility under consideration—or just the specific CCS components that would enable the facility to effectively capture and store its carbon dioxide emissions.
Funding should only be eligible to finance incremental costs incurred as a result of CO2 capture, transport, and storage efforts—not the full cost of the project.

Topic 3: Project Eligibility Criteria

Project objectives: Finance should be primarily directed toward projects that either actively store CO2 or directly provide the basis for near-future CO2 storage locally, avoiding duplication with other existing funding mechanisms.
Project scales and types: To maximize both near-term and future storage, eligible project types should cover geological site characterization and integrated CCS projects, both at the pilot and commercial demonstration scales.
Project sectors: CCS projects in fossil fuel power plants are likely to be the largest recipients of funding. However, some industrial CO2 sources may present advantages that could facilitate timely and cost-effective development of CCS projects in developing countries. “Low-hanging fruit” projects in industrial facilities with high-purity CO2 streams can advance infrastructure and technologic know-how in developing countries at a fraction of the cost of implementing CCS at a power plant. Funding criteria should therefore not discriminate against industrial sources of CO2.
EOR and other CCUS projects: Enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and other carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS) projects have multiple advantages for early CCS development and can result in the net storage of CO2, warranting their inclusion in financing opportunities. However, awarding of CCS financing to CCUS projects should occur only where projects are managed and monitored with the aim of permanent CO2 storage.
Additional project requirements: Funding criteria should stipulate that awarded projects employ sound procedures for CCS site selection, operation, and stewardship. Site selection must be based on specific geologic characteristics. Awarded projects must also have monitoring plans in place for both the operational and the post-closure stewardship phase and ideally demonstrate local government support and local community buy-in.

Topic 4: Project Selection Process

In order to make the selection process as equitable and objective as possible while maximizing CCS deployment goals, projects that meet funding demonstration objectives should be awarded on a competitive basis under a points-based system to judge applications. Such system should reward, among other factors, storage efficiency, geographic diversity, and contribution to wider CCS advancement in developing countries.
The selection system should also favor improving knowledge of storage opportunities through projects implemented in deep saline formations, since they represent the largest knowledge gap and the largest storage potential in the future.

Topic 5: Financing Mechanism Characteristics

Significant attention has been focused on creating an international public fund solely dedicated to CCS, or a CCS window within a larger fund that may also finance other pre-commercial, low-carbon technologies in developing countries. Additional research is needed to ascertain the pros and cons of different structures in a developing country environment. However, there are several advantages of adopting a CCS-only mechanism for the early demonstration phase, instead of having CCS in direct competition with other technologies for the same pool of funds.
In order to meet the IEA-recommended storage goal of 45–60 million tons of CO2 in 10 years, a CCS fund needs to be able to invest or leverage total investments of US$5– 8 billion and have the capacity to disburse its resources effectively over the same period.
A CCS fund should employ strong early-mover and CO2 storage incentive provisions to leverage its goals. A 10-year storage incentive on a rising scale could be applied to ensure project operators act to permanently reduce emissions.

Innovation and Technology Transfer: Supporting Low Carbon Development with Climate Finance

Maggie Barron — Sun, 16 Jan 2011 15:47:02 -0500

Overview

Meeting the ambitious goal of limiting global warming to 2° Celsius or less will require significant innovation - the improvement of technologies and processes to drive down their cost and improve their performance. Public climate finance is essential to spurring innovation and creating the conditions that attract private investment. Investing in innovation also makes the most efficient use of the limited financial resources available and takes advantage of the developing world’s growth to improve technologies.

Countries like the UAE have an opportunity to play a pioneering role in this expanded international innovation system. Innovation will be underpinned by international cooperation that supports:

priority setting and coordination,
joint research, development and demonstration,
sharing information and knowledge,
capacity building,
provision of finance and
supporting hubs and networks.

Several international forums can fulfill portions of these functions, but each faces its own limitations and risks. In this context the UAE could uncover opportunities to be an innovation leader. For example:

How can IRENA and Masdar develop into a world-class innovation hub and then effectively link into the international innovation system?
How can the UNFCCC’s Climate Technology Center and Network function effectively?
How can other forums such as the Clean Energy Ministerial develop to support the international innovation effort?
How can public climate finance be used to support innovation while deploying clean technology in the developing world?

Scaling Up Low-Carbon Technology Deployment: Lessons from China

Maggie Barron — Fri, 01 Oct 2010 13:33:28 -0400

Executive Summary

The low-carbon energy imperative

Among the issues domestic and international policymakers must address in combating climate change is how to deploy and diffuse current low-carbon technologies in developing countries.

Developing countries, while bearing little responsibility for historical releases of greenhouse gases (GHG), now account for an increasingly large percentage of global atmospheric emissions. Today, they make up around 50 percent of emissions (CAIT 2005) and by 2030 this figure will rise to 65 percent (EIA 2009). Thus, without widespread deployment of low-carbon technologies in China, India, and beyond, global efforts to stabilize emissions and prevent dangerous levels of warming will be severely undermined.

Globally, while the pace of technology deployment has dramatically accelerated over recent decades, technology deployment within low- and middle-income countries remains slow. Only 30 percent of developing countries have reached the 25 percent penetration threshold and only 9 percent have reached the 50 percent threshold for technologies invented between 1975 and 2000 (Comin & Hobijn 2004). Low-carbon technology deployment generally aligns with this rule, with a few exceptions, notably China.

China’s leadership and approaches The speed and scale of technology deployment is highly correlated with income level. Despite being a lower-middleincome country, China has bucked this trend, boasting technological achievements greater than those of many high-income countries. In particular, China’s government has poured money, R&D resources, and a combination of incentives and regulatory levers, into developing and deploying technologies in the cleaner energy (such as supercritical/ultrasupercritical coal-fired power generation), renewable energy, and energy efficiency sectors. It has also invested in a range of partnership models with overseas governments and companies, including joint ventures, licensing agreements, and joint design. As a result, China has transformed itself over the past two decades from a low-carbon technology importer to a major manufacturer of a number of low-carbon technologies.

Scaling Up Low-Carbon Technology Deployment: Lessons from China examines how low-carbon technologies have been introduced, adapted, deployed, and diffused in three greenhouse gas-intensive sectors in China. By focusing on key policy and program drivers, the report identifies the building blocks for China’s successful low-carbon technology deployment infrastructure. Its purpose is twofold: to draw lessons of use in informing broader international cooperation on technology transfer and deployment; and to help governments and industries in middle- and low-income countries to pursue an effective transition to a low-carbon economy.

Focus technologies

This report focuses on three energy technologies:

supercritical/ultrasupercritical (SC/USC) coal-fired power generation technology;
onshore wind energy technology; and
blast furnace top gas recovery turbine (TRT)technology in the steel sector.

Why these particular technologies? First, all three if widely deployed could make a significant dent in emissions of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas. As the power and steel sectors are major global energy consumers, efficiency improvement in these sectors entails large carbon dioxide reduction. Wind, the fastest growing renewable energy source, is the most likely renewable technology to capture a big share of the global electricity mix. Coal will likely remain a key global energy provider for decades to come. Second, these three technologies present diverse opportunities for future deployment both in China and internationally. Such diversity enables the lessons contained in this report to address issues across a broad spectrum of low-carbon technology deployment— thus maximizing its potential impact.

Key findings

China has accelerated its low-carbon technology deployment in recent decades, making the transition from technology importer to major manufacturer of a number of low-carbon technologies. China has made comprehensive efforts to put in place the infrastructure to achieve accelerated deployment and diffusion of the three technologies examined in this report. This indicates its commitment to becoming a global player in the low-carbon economy, securing a domestic energy supply, and reducing carbon dioxide emissions.
China’s experience highlights the important role of effective domestic policy in stimulating low-carbon technology. While the government took different approaches for each of the three technologies examined in this report, its building blocks for technology deployment infrastructure include:

Making a deliberate, holistic plan and long-term commitment to the localization of a low-carbon technology. This approach is taken in all three cases.
Establishing direct R&D funding programs to support the launch and scale-up of low-carbon technology innovation. This approach is especially prominent in the case of SC/USC coal-fired power generation technology.
Improving businesses’ technological absorptive capacity through directly funding their technology learning. The success enjoyed by two leading Chinese clean energy companies—Goldwind’s surge in the global wind market and Shanxi Glower Group’s dominance of the domestic TRT market— are both indebted to this measure.
Capitalizing on public-private and industryacademia synergies to bring together multi-sector expertise. The success of the localization of SC/ USC in particular is built on such multi-sector synergies.
Designing national-level and sector-wide laws, policies, and regulations to scale-up commercialization of low-carbon technology, create domestic markets, and drive down the costs. The rapid development of domestic wind energy greatly benefited from such a legal and regulatory infrastructure.
Relying on international cooperation to pursue new-to-market technology and knowledge. TRT technology’s transfer and deployment resulted from China-Japan cooperation in the steel sector.

China’s ambitious localization process for low-carbon technology has raised concerns about intellectual property rights (IPR) within some foreign governments and among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) companies. The case studies found the situation regarding technology transfer to be more complex, including issues related to ambiguous ownership and contractual arrangements as well as IPR. While our case studies show that some foreign firms have benefited significantly from China’s low-carbon technology sector, both the SC/USC and TRT case studies reveal that while the Chinese government viewed these models as successful, international companies involved were less convinced. Our survey of multinationals involved in China’s low-carbon technology sector also revealed that such firms typically do not transfer all parts of a technology to China, holding back some of their IPR. This approach addresses the international companies’ concerns about IPR protection, but compared to an atmosphere of higher trust is suboptimal both for Chinese and overseas companies.

Conclusions and lessons learned

For Chinese policymakers:

China’s comprehensive efforts to put in place the infrastructure to achieve accelerated deployment and diffusion of low-carbon technology has been very successful in the three technologies examined in this report. Within 20 years, China emerged from a technology importer to a major manufacturer of low-carbon technology. If the same level of effort continues, China could soon be a player at the forefront of low-carbon energy technology innovation. However, underlying China’s success are some concerns that need to be addressed.
China’s preoccupation with localizing key energy technologies may be viewed by foreign companies and governments as going against standard international business practices, such as relying on trade to acquire technologies. The global wind industry, for example, is a globally integrated industry. China’s ambition to localize key wind energy technologies, such as bearing and electric controls, leaves China outside the global integration process—a process that can be harnessed to reduce the cost of wind technologies by increasing economies of scale, fostering competition, and encouraging innovation (Kirkegaard et al. 2009).
In spite of the national government’s effective technology deployment policy, China has not yet addressed the pressing issue of deployment of low-quality technologies. The low entry barrier for domestic wind energy developers highlighted by the wind case study, in particular, underscores the importance of setting high technology standards at the beginning of technology deployment.
China’s business sector still has lessons to learn in conducting international business negotiations. On the one hand we see government-managed processes in the coal and steel sectors that—while effective—may have left some legacy of distrust; on the other hand we see the hyper-competitiveness of the wind industry with its minimal barriers to entry. Nurturing a more sophisticated domestic business sector through market means is a key task for Chinese policymakers seeking to minimize costs and barriers and maximize trust and cooperation so as to scale-up low-carbon energy industries.

For U.S. policymakers:

China’s ambition is to emerge as a global science and technology power and Beijing is keenly aware that the next phase of the science and technology revolution will likely center on low-carbon technology. While the term “indigenous innovation” has been interpreted in international policy circles as encompassing a very narrow group of government procurement policies, in fact, the policies are much more ambitious and involve the kinds of long-term support for RD&D that are detailed in these three case studies.
There are major business opportunities for U.S. companies in China’s low-carbon technology deployment efforts. The success of Japanese and German companies in the wind and power sectors indicates that through joint venture, licensing, or joint design, foreign technology providers can benefit from China’s financial resources, manufacturing capacity, and enormous market. While China’s ambitious localization process for low-carbon technology has raised concerns about intellectual property rights in some foreign governments and among OECD companies, major multinationals surveyed as part of the study did not view IPR as a major issue. In the three case studies, the issue was somewhat more ambiguous. There did not appear to be any outright IPR violation, but instead different perceptions of ownership and contracts have colored some of the arrangements.
China’s experience highlights the importance of effective domestic policy and long-term government commitment. Without clear and lasting signals from the government and a central role for government-funded R&D, the market will not automatically embrace low-carbon technology.

For technology providers:

China’s preference for domestically manufactured technologies can present a competitive risk for foreign companies seeking a foothold in China. However, in practice, depending on the technology investors’ own conditions and needs, foreign technology providers can make a profit through various approaches, including:

Joint venture: Benefits include easy access to the Chinese market and freedom for foreign companies to use their own business model to sell products. One disadvantage is the possibility of leaking intellectual property rights to local partners. Because of this drawback, many joint-venture companies in China act as manufacturers or post-sale maintenance facilities instead of technology developers.
Licensing: Its benefit is guaranteed patent fees and royalties free of concerns about the technology users’ business model. The disadvantage is that China’s exports might swamp the marketplace and the patent owners receive only a small portion of the profit, usually from 3–6 percent of profits.
Joint design: If technology providers lack manufacturing capacity and financial resources, joint design offers good access to China’s financial capital and enormous market. The drawback is that in most cases all patent rights are lost to the Chinese partner companies.
Wholly foreign-owned investment: Benefits include freedom for foreign investors to use their own business models and easy access to China’s large skilled and relatively inexpensive labor force. For China this is a mechanism for training up a workforce in new technologies and related services. The disadvantage for the foreign company is that the Chinese government and scholars do not view wholly foreign-owned investment as a technology transfer mechanism. Therefore the foreign investors are less likely to receive administrative or financial support from the Chinese government.

For other countries who are adapting technology:

Other countries might lack the tremendous scale of resources for domestic investment in R&D that China can bring to bear, but China’s experience demonstrates some clear successes from which other countries can benefit. These include: the active role of the government in pursuing bilateral engagement internationally (in the case of steel); the importance of providing clear and lasting policy signals for clean energy markets (in the case of wind); and the central role that government-funded R&D can play (as illustrated by the localization of all three technologies).