WRI Publications Feed: Climate, Energy & Transport

The German Fast-Start Finance Contribution

Sarah Parsons — Thu, 09 May 2013 16:27:15 -0400

Summary

Industrialized countries have repeatedly committed to provide new and additional finance to help developing countries transition to low-carbon and climate-resilient growth. This assessment addresses German efforts to provide “fast start finance” (FSF) as a contribution to the pledge by developed countries to provide USD 30 billion from 2010 to 2012 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is part of a series of studies scrutinizing how developed countries are defining, delivering, and reporting FSF.

Germany has increased climate finance in recent years and met its self-defined FSF pledge. According to the government’s FSF reporting, from 2010-2012 Germany provided a total of EUR 1.29 billion (approximately USD 1.7 billion) for climate action in developing countries that was counted towards FSF. Germany has therefore slightly exceeded its FSF pledge for the period 2010-2012. Even before the start of the FSF period, Germany was already providing significant funding for climate change-related activities in developing countries, particularly for renewable energy and energy efficiency. It therefore started from a relatively high climate finance baseline. Moreover, FSF is only a part of what the German government provides in climate-related finance for developing countries. Overall, Germany has increased delivery of international climate finance when compared to climate-related spending prior to the FSF period: In 2011, Germany committed about EUR 1.8 billion in total for climate finance, an increase from EUR 470 million in 2005.

Germany’s FSF is roughly evenly distributed be¬tween bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Out of the EUR 1.29 billion, EUR 585 million was channelled through multilateral funds. The largest single channel is the World Bank-administered Climate Technology Fund (CTF), which received EUR 375 million from Germany from 2010-2012. Substantial amounts of funding were also transferred to adaptation-related multilateral funds and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Two federal ministries, the German Federal Ministry Economic Coop¬eration and Development (BMZ), and the German Federal Ministry Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), are responsible for the disbursement of FSF resources. Nearly half of this funding has been channelled through the German development cooperation agencies GIZ and KfW. Relatively few resources were delivered directly to developing country domestic institutions.

Germany FSF has primarily supported general mitigation (45 percent), and efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation (26 percent), while 28 percent supports adaptation. Germany aimed to provide 50 percent of its climate finance for mitigation, 33 percent for adaptation activities, and 27 percent (EUR 350 million) for REDD+. The Copenhagen Accord sought a balance between adap¬tation and mitigation (including REDD+) during the FSF period. Adaptation has received less finance than expected at the outset of the FSF period. Overall, most German FSF resources have been allocated to the regions of Africa (34 percent) and Asia (29 percent). Additionally, roughly 60 percent of all adaptation finance and 50 percent of bilateral adaptation finance has been allocated to Small Island Developing States, Least Developed Countries, and African countries.

The majority of Germany’s FSF is provided through grants. Loans are provided to the CTF, and account for about 29 percent of the overall FSF contribution. Germany is relatively transparent about its FSF. Through BMU and BMZ, the German government publishes lists of the FSF projects it supports, reporting on the recipient country, project name, project description, objective, amount, implementing agency, financial instrument, and expected project duration. It also reports to the European Commission (EC) on an annual basis. In addition, Germany has commissioned a study on lessons learned from FSF for long-term finance. However, official reporting would be strengthened through the inclusion of information on the actual disbursements and on project impact.

Germany is one of the few countries which has applied and published a specific definition of “new and additional” for its FSF. Germany only counts those funds towards FSF which were committed in addition to a 2009 baseline (as part of Official Development Assistance, or ODA, spending) and/or which are generated by new financing sources, namely the auctioning revenues under the EU ETS. Nonetheless, some of the financial resources counted as FSF were pledged before the FSF period: for example, Germany pledged finance to the CIFs in 2008, but only funding delivered from 2010 onwards was counted as FSF. All German FSF is counted towards ODA. However, Germany has yet to meet its commitment to provide 0.7 percent of its Gross National Income as ODA, and in fact its ODA contributions have recently declined. Also, Germany’s climate finance is committed in the context of a complementary commitment to scale up finance for biodiversity under the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). It will be important to monitor reporting against both of these commitments in order to understand whether pledges have been duplicated or recycled.

Most of the projects counted towards FSF seem to have a principal or at least significant climate objective. An independent application of the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) climate markers to the FSF projects suggests that the vast majority of projects seems to have a clear climate element, based on limited project informaiton. However, a focus on only bilateral projects reveals that the share of principally climate-driven projects may be lower than bilateral projects committed to other climate objectives. Furthermore, an assessment of the incremental climate change costs that are covered through the projects is not available.

Germany is one of the few developed countries to have committed climate finance beyond the FSF period. At COP18, Germany pledged to deliver EUR 1.8 billion in climate finance in 2013, an increase from the EUR 1.4 billion delivered in 2012.1 These funds will come from the general budget and from the “Sondervermögen Energie und Klimafonds” (“Special Energy and Climate Fund”). This separate budget structure is financed by auctioning revenues from the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The current low prices of carbon, however, may reduce available climate finance beyond 2012.

With regard to reporting on international climate finance, we suggest the following actions to further in¬crease transparency:

Continue to publish annual, project-level information after the close of the FSF period. Reporting systems could be updated to reflect the parameters of the new United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) common reporting format (for example, by specifying the sectors to which funding is directed). It could also seek to improve reporting on the actual state of implementation of projects, and actual disbursement of committed funds. Therefore, Germany may explore practical options for providing some project-level information on the results of at least the larger programs funded in real time, e.g on the basis of the project reporting that is required of implementers (such as through annual or evaluation reports).
Provide additional information on which projects are funded by which ministries.
Provide more detailed financial information on projects that meet commitments to increase both climate and biodiversity finance to provide greater clarity on synergies, and assure that finance has not been double-counted. Such reporting can also be related to climate finance reporting under the OECD climate markers, in order to ensure consistency with FSF reporting.
Further strengthen and harmonize reporting and transparency standards for implementing institutions, in particular dedicated multilateral climate funds. Ger¬many can support progress to this end as a member of the governing bodies of these funds.

With regard to Germany’s international climate finance approach as a whole, we offer the following recommendations:

Continue to work to increase support for adaptation, with the goal of achieving a greater balance between adaptation and mitigation.
Explore ways to work more closely with recipient country-based institutions through its delivery of climate finance. This may need to be accompanied by capacity building support in order to increase these countries’ capacity to access such funding and use it effectively.
Explore options to ensure that increasing climate finance as part of efforts to deliver ODA does not reduce support available to help countries address development challenges as a whole. In the German case, the fact that ODA has been declining while climate finance increases at a relatively rapid rate presents a particular challenge.
Consider options to find more reliable sources of climate finance. The German climate finance approach has been largely sourced through the revenues from emission-trading. Nevertheless, there is a need for all countries to further scale-up climate finance in order to meet agreed goals of mobilising USD 100 billion from a mix of public and private sources by 2020. Options might include multilateral efforts to strengthen the EU ETS through increased EU mitigation targets, as well as the deployment of other innovative sources, such as financial transaction taxes or revenues from international transport. A clear pathway for scaling up climate finance would help create greater predictability of finance, and help generate trust and ambition in developing countries.

The U.S. Contribution to Fast-Start Finance: FY12 Update

Sarah Parsons — Tue, 23 Apr 2013 14:06:17 -0400

Summary

As part of the international climate negotiations, developed country governments committed to provide developing countries with “new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions, approaching $30 billion in the period 2010-2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation.” This fact sheet considers U.S. efforts to provide “fast-start finance” (FSF) over the full three-year period, drawing primarily from program data presented in the State Department’s report series, “Meeting the Fast Start Commitment.” The fact sheet is part of a series of analyses on FSF contributions, and updates a May 2012 working paper quantifying total U.S. contributions to the global FSF commitment.

Over the FSF period, the United States has reported roughly $7.5 billion, or about 20% of the global self-reported total flows of FSF. Notable attributes of the U.S. FSF contribution include:

The levels of finance fluctuated over the three-year period, with the largest volume in FY11. This is related to variations in spending on the part of key agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).
Over the three-year period, a significant share of the U.S. portfolio supported clean energy in Asia. OPIC and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) played key roles in administering finance, and finance was channeled via a combination of grants and loans, guarantees, and insurance.

Transparency has improved in FY12 reporting, but there is room for further improvement. In addition to implementing the new international reporting requirements adopted at Doha, the following actions would help support verification of aggregate figures, as well as coordination and accountability:

Publishing a detailed, disaggregated, annual list of projects and programs;
Using the Foreign Assistance Dashboard as a platform for sharing information;
Aligning reporting under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with reporting to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); and
Continuing to work with other countries and multilateral institutions to strengthen and harmonize reporting systems.

Striking the Balance: Ownership and Accountability in Social and Environmental Safeguards

Sarah Parsons — Thu, 11 Apr 2013 15:05:46 -0400

Executive Summary

Many governments around the world have put in place systems to help ensure that investments in changes such as infrastructure projects, government programs or new national laws do not bring undue harm to their citizens or environment. The effectiveness of these systems in successfully preventing negative impacts varies widely. Developing countries tend to have a particularly difficult time ensuring that investments within their borders meet minimum social and environmental standards. As a result, many financial institutions have established their own policies to help ensure that their investments do not result in harm to vulnerable communities or ecosystems. These policies are generally known as “safeguards.” Although safeguard policies provide vital protection against risks to people and the environment, properly designing and implementing these policies means navigating complex relationships between financial institutions, governments, and the citizens of recipient countries.

The World Bank (the Bank) has been at the forefront among multilateral development banks in developing safeguard policies. In recent decades, the Bank has experimented with different approaches to social and environmental protection. These approaches respond in part to variations in the way in which countries receive money from the Bank, such as investments in projects versus policies. They have also emerged in reaction to the changing global landscape. Some developing countries have become richer and created stronger systems to protect people and the environment. The global community has also realized the value of letting developing countries define their own development path. At the same time, the pressing need to protect our global common goods and most vulnerable communities has become more apparent.

This working paper seeks to help the Bank and other financial institutions take stock of experiences to date and distill lessons for the future. We look at four different approaches to protecting against social and environmental harm: the traditional safeguards approach, which applies to most project lending; the Use of Country Systems approach, which the Bank has applied to some project lending on a pilot basis; the approach used for Program for Results investments, which applies to the Bank’s results-based lending pilot; and the approach used for Development Policy Loans, which applies to loans that support changes to policies and institutions.

While all four of these approaches rely on the rules and institutions of the recipient country, they do so to different degrees. Through an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each of approach, we arrive at seven lessons for the World Bank and other financial institutions looking to balance ownership and accountabil¬ity in their social and environmental policies:

Building on country safeguard systems can enhance ownership and incentives for safeguard implementation.
Minimum standards and positive incentives can clarify requirements and encourage countries to strive toward more ambitious social and environmental goals.
Safeguard implementation requires anticipating risks, planning to deal with those risks, managing and monitoring implementation, and responding to harm.
Proper safeguard implementation requires people on the ground to engage, collaborate and problem solve.
Recipient country safeguard systems still need support.
Citizens play a key role in any effective safeguard system.
To successfully balance ownership and accountability, safeguard approaches need to recognize differences among countries, sectors, and projects.

Clearing the Air: Reducing Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions from U.S. Natural Gas Systems

Sarah Parsons — Wed, 03 Apr 2013 17:48:29 -0400

Key Findings

Fugitive methane emissions from natural gas systems represent a significant source of global warming pollution in the U.S. Reductions in methane emissions are urgently needed as part of the broader effort to slow the rate of global temperature rise.
Cutting methane leakage rates from natural gas systems to less than 1 percent of total production would ensure that the climate impacts of natural gas are lower than coal or diesel fuel over any time horizon. This goal can be achieved by reducing emissions by one-half to two-thirds below current levels through the widespread use of proven, cost-effective technologies.
Fugitive methane emissions occur at every stage of the natural gas life cycle; however, the total amount of leakage is unclear. More comprehensive and current direct emissions measurements are needed from this regionally diverse and rapidly expanding energy sector.
Recent standards from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will substantially reduce leakage from natural gas systems, but to help slow the rate of global warming and improve air quality, further action by states and EPA should directly address fugitive methane from new and existing wells and equipment.
Federal rules building on existing Clean Air Act (CAA) authorities could provide an appropriate framework for reducing upstream methane emissions. This approach accounts for input by affected industries, while allowing flexibility for states to implement rules according to unique local circumstances.

A Critical Decade for Climate Policy: Tools and Initiatives to Track Our Progress

Sarah Parsons — Wed, 06 Mar 2013 19:13:21 -0500

Summary

The last five years have seen both broad and deep advancements in national policies to mitigate future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The next five years will be instrumental in ensuring that these policies are implemented effectively, creating sustained change that will achieve gigatonne-scale GHG reductions, and laying the foundation for countries to move ahead with ever more ambitious approaches to reduce GHG emissions and limit the dangers and costs of a changing climate.

In order to support effective development and implementation of climate policies, a suite of policy tracking tools and initiatives is evolving, with a variety of characteristics tuned to address different questions and audiences. Underlying these efforts is the observation of metrics related to climate policy development, adoption, implementation, and/or effect. These initiatives seek to complement the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) processes under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), promoting accountability for governments to set and meet ambitious yet feasible goals and targets, identifying barriers and facilitating course corrections when necessary, and ultimately supporting overall policy progress and effectiveness.

Government and intergovernmental organizations are the key actors who adopt and implement policies and actions; however, independent analysts, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector play a vital role from the early stage development of climate, energy, and land use policies on through to adoption and into implementation, in order to ultimately achieve the desired GHG reductions. In this context, the field of climate policy tracking can serve to:

Build and maintain political momentum, and offer technical analysis and design principles.
Provide independent estimates of likely policy effects as well as risks, strengths, and uncertainty.
Spread shared learning and best practices between countries or sectors to improve efficacy.
Juxtapose policy portfolios with reduction pledges, abatement potential, and climate needs.

In order to succeed in this role, a complete climate policy tracking landscape needs to fulfill a range of functions, which may then be tailored to particular needs and questions. Successful efforts will have many things in common. Ongoing and continuous monitoring of policy progress should be coupled with evaluations of policy effectiveness and appraisals of likely and expected outcomes of policy trajectories. A combination of quantitative and qualitative inputs and outputs are necessary both to measure expected outcomes and progress toward milestones, but also to recognize the non-linear and imprecise nature of policy development and implementation.

This paper represents an initial effort by our institutions to broaden our collective lens and learn more from each other and our peers in the climate policy tracking community. We will supplement this analysis in the future, and aim to convene practitioners on a regular basis. Given our current understanding of the climate policy tracking landscape, we offer the following observations:

The climate policy tracking community has developed a diverse portfolio of methodologies and frameworks to address a range of policy tracking needs.
Nevertheless, information about climate policies remains patchy. In particular, there is little coordinated monitoring of policy implementation (in contrast to policy adoption) or of policies currently under development. Geographies are unevenly covered and quantifications and projections are often inconsistent.
Many climate policy tracking efforts are conducted by international organizations and target the needs of an international audience, though some good examples exist at the country level.
Technical abatement potential serves as a useful goalpost but lacks political and policy context.

Drawing from this body of work, we offer the following recommendations for other practitioners, funders, and governments:

Deepen monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation and policies under development, drawing on existing methodologies and frameworks.
Strengthen climate policy tracking at the country level—in partnership with national organizations—while maintaining internationally focused efforts.
Enhance coordination and collaboration among climate policy tracking practitioners, including with regard to ongoing refinement of methodologies, coordinating deployment of methodologies to answer priority questions, and communicating results.
Continue to scope out emerging issues, including country- and sector-specific tracking efforts, the intersection of independent tracking with biennial reports and biennial update reports under the UNFCCC, and the need to develop a more nuanced understanding of abatement potential to inform ambitious yet feasible goals against which to track progress.

Fact Sheet: 2012, A Year of Record-Breaking Extreme Weather and Climate

Sarah Parsons — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 10:13:20 -0500

Summary

The United States experienced its hottest year on record in 2012.

On a global scale, not only did last year mark the 36th consecutive year the annual global temperature was above average, but each successive decade in the last 50 years has been the warmest on record. Additionally, the recent draft National Climate Assessment states that it is “virtually certain” that global temperatures will continue to warm throughout the remainder of the century, and the longer we delay reducing greenhouse gas emissions the greater the magnitude of warming will occur. In a warmer world, the trend of increasing extreme weather and climate events is expected to continue – 2011 and 2012 each experienced more extreme weather and climate events costing over $1 billion each than any other year in recorded history.

The 8-inch rise in average global sea level over the last century has intensified the impacts of storm surge. This was exemplified during Hurricane Sandy, where record high water levels and abnormally warm ocean temperatures amplified the storm’s impact along the coast of the Northeast United States. State officials in New York and New Jersey estimated aggregate losses of nearly $80 billion from Sandy, shattering the aggregate $55 billion in losses caused by weather and climate disasters in 2011 – a year when a record 14 extreme weather and climate events caused at least $1 billion in losses each.

Download the full fact sheet for more figures relating to temperature, Hurricane Sandy, wildfires, drought, sea level rise, and melting ice.

Can the U.S. Get There from Here? Using Existing Federal Laws and State Action to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Sarah Parsons — Tue, 05 Feb 2013 16:51:17 -0500

Summary

U.S. greenhouse gas emissions are expected to rise unless additional policy actions are taken. This report identifies a suite of policies that the Administration can pursue that do not require new legislation by the U.S. Congress. If pursued with “go-getter” level ambition, those policies can reduce U.S. emissions 17 percent below 2005 levels in 2020.

Key Findings

Without new action by the U.S. Administration, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will increase over time. The United States will fail to make the deep emissions reductions needed in coming decades, and will not meet its international commitment to reduce GHG emissions by 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020.
The U.S. EPA should immediately pursue “go-getter” emissions reductions from power plants and natural gas systems using its authority under the Clean Air Act. These two sectors represent two of the top opportunities for substantial GHG reductions between now and 2035.
The U.S. Administration should pursue hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) reductions through both the Montreal Protocol process and under its independent Clean Air Act authority. Eliminating HFCs represents the biggest opportunity for GHG emissions reductions behind power plants.
U.S. states should complement federal actions to reduce emissions through state energy efficiency, renewables, transportation, and other actions. States can augment federal reductions.
New federal legislation will eventually be needed, because even go-getter action by federal and state governments will probably fail to achieve the more than 80 percent GHG emissions reductions necessary to fend off the most deleterious impacts of climate change.

This chart shows potential reductions under existing federal authorities and state action through 2035.

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Presentation

Can The U.S. Get There From Here? from World Resources Institute (WRI)

Testimony: American Energy Security and Innovation: An Assessment of North America's Energy Resources

Sarah Parsons — Tue, 05 Feb 2013 15:21:07 -0500

Summary of Key Points

Our energy choices need to factor in both opportunities and risks. This testimony gives particular attention to why we must consider the risk of climate change, both on our resources being developed and utilized today and on our choices for development into the future. It concludes with the following recommendations:

Congress should request that the National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee review the current authorities of federal agencies and national laboratories, and recommend how consideration of risks associated with climate change can be more directly incorporated into decision-making.
Congress should support efforts to better assess the impacts of climate change on America’s energy infrastructure and incorporate this into planning and investment decisions.
Congress should keep in mind four important criteria in considering policies to drive more effective clean energy growth and competitiveness: any energy policy should be comprehensive, long-term, targeted, and inclusive.
In capturing energy efficiency across the economy, Congress can play a constructive role in two key areas:
- Informed consumer choice: supporting and expanding programs to help ensure product labeling is accurate and publicly reported in a timely manner, to encourage energy-wise investment decisions throughout the U.S. economy.
- Efficiency standards: supporting and extending the ability of federal agencies to develop and update energy efficiency standards for vehicles, appliances, and other energy-consuming equipment that is sold into U.S. commerce.
Congress must work toward reaching bipartisan agreement on national energy policies that encourage more efficient energy consumption, increase the diversity of domestic energy production, maximize deployment of low-carbon energy technologies, and minimize environmental impacts throughout our energy systems. In the near-term, it is also critical for Congress to provide funding and incentives for low-carbon and clean energy technologies.

Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in the UK: An Overview of the Current Policy Landscape

Sarah Parsons — Tue, 11 Dec 2012 11:39:44 -0500

Executive Summary

Domestic legislation – the Climate Change Act 2008 – commits the United Kingdom to an 80 percent emission reduction by 2050 on 1990 levels, and to a system of 5-year carbon budgets to progress toward that target. These carbon budgets require UK emission reductions on 1990 levels of 34 percent by 2020 and 50 percent by 2025. The Carbon Plan, published in December 2011, sets out the UK Government’s plans to keep within its carbon budgets. An independent body – the Committee on Climate Change – advises the government on the setting of carbon targets, and reports to Parliament annually on progress. The UK also has commitments under EU-wide emission reduction targets.

This report summarizes key UK policies already enacted and in development that are likely to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions across the UK, discusses the implications of the current policy scenario for the country’s GHG trajectory, and identifies issues to watch going forward. Policy measures currently in place to reduce UK GHG emissions include the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), a key policy lever covering emissions from power generation and energy-intensive industry; the EU Renewable Energy Directive, under which the UK has a target to increase the share of renewables in final energy to 15 percent in 2020; and energy efficiency programs for residential buildings, requirements to reduce average new car and van emissions, and a range of other measures across the rest of the economy, not covered by the EU ETS.

Our analysis and the government’s own projections suggest the UK is on course to meet its carbon budgets out to 2022 – and, consequently, its share of the EU’s commitment under the UNFCCC. Meeting the fourth carbon budget (2023–27), however, will require a further acceleration of emission reduction, suggesting the need for emissions in the third budget period (2018–22) to be significantly below the legislated level. To secure such an outcome requires strong and timely implementation of additional measures, with quicker delivery than in the past.

If future carbon budgets are to be met, progress in emission reduction must accelerate. The government is moving forward with plans to reform the electricity market through a system of long-term contracts designed to give greater confidence in investment in low-carbon generation. A new flagship energy efficiency policy – the Green Deal and Energy Company Obligation – is being introduced. It is not clear whether this will deliver on the required scale. Looking forward, key issues will be around the strength of implementation of policies currently being developed (especially electricity market reform and the Green Deal) and the review of the fourth carbon budget (covering emissions in 2023–27), which the government plans to undertake in 2014.

Defining the Shale Gas Life Cycle: A Framework for Identifying and Mitigating Environmental Impacts

Sarah Parsons — Thu, 06 Dec 2012 14:53:32 -0500

Executive Summary

Life cycle assessments of shale gas activities differ in their findings. Among the various studies, researchers estimate different greenhouse gas emissions, rates of water use, and rates of wastewater production.

Some of the variation in findings is due to the parameters of each study, particularly the life cycle boundary. The life cycle boundary determines which life cycle stages—and which processes attributable to those stages—are included in the assessment. For example, a life cycle boundary for shale gas often includes stages for exploration, drilling, fracturing, well production, processing, and combustion. Attributable processes further define the activities in those stages. However, some assessments omit stages—such as exploration, processing, or combustion—or do not delineate between stages and processes at all. The variations make it difficult to compare assessments and begin a constructive dialogue on strategies that reduce impacts.

This working paper proposes a life cycle boundary for shale gas spanning exploration to well closure/site remediation and from natural gas production to use. It follows the boundary setting guidance given in the Greenhouse Gas Protocol Product Life Cycle Accounting and Reporting Standard, which builds and expands on the ISO 14044 standard for life cycle assessment. In addition, WRI compares its life cycle boundary to those in 16 assessments of the environmental impacts of shale gas production. The findings illustrate significant variations in the scope of such studies, which complicate shale gas discussions. WRI will seek feedback on its life cycle boundary and apply it in a forthcoming working paper that summarizes the findings of previous assessments on the greenhouse gas emissions of shale gas production; estimates the implications on emissions from the Environmental Protection Agency’s revised Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule; and highlights the potential for additional methane abatement from natural gas systems in the United States.