Realizing the inequitable distribution of environmental degradation and mitigation efforts compels us to propose just solutions to environmental problems in lieu of equitable solutions. Such a proposal has serious implications for institutions that work on global environmental problems. Equitable benefit-sharing schemes—within the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention on Climate Change—become questionable and perpetuate injustice when we recognize historical patterns of injustice. If local communities benefit the least and incur the greatest costs from biodiversity conservation, “fair and equitable” sharing of “the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources” ex post facto may only serve to maintain inequalities.

In the context of the waste trade, environmental justice argues for prior-informed-consent (PIC) mechanisms in agreements that regulate the trade between exporters and importers. Beyond PIC, a comprehensive ban on the trade of waste from wealthier countries to poorer ones is long overdue. Further still, chemicals must be stripped of human rights deeming them innocent (i.e., safe) until proven guilty (i.e., unsafe, carcinogenic, or deadly). Viewing chemicals as inherently unsafe would drastically alter the associated regulatory frameworks that dictate their production and introduction into the biosphere. More important, it would shift the burden of proof to polluters who harm, discriminate, or fail to equally protect marginalized people.

An environmental justice analysis, in the United States and globally, attempts to identify and eliminate legacies of systematic,  harmful, and disproportionate effects of environmental degradation and mitigation efforts. It is not about redistributing or transferring benefits and burdens after environmental harm is done to particular communities—this is environmental equity, not justice. In an unjust world, environmental benefits, such as those from conservation programs, need to be disproportionately remitted to those who incurred past, disproportionate harm. Simultaneously, the means to “cost sharing” must be radically reconceptualized. Treating environmental problems after communities have been harmed has to be replaced by moves to prevent environmental problems from occurring in the first place.