Some decentralization advocates—governments, donors, and NGOs—view the poor as particular beneficiaries of decentralization. They envision reforms that make policies more useful to the poor, and processes that encourage the involvement of the most socially disenfranchised people in natural resource decision making— those people who have the greatest stake in the outcome of management decisions (Asante and Ayee 2004:3-6,21-22). These advocates point out that effectively implementing poverty reduction strategies often requires specific local knowledge that is best found in local institutions, and that strengthening local delivery capacity for services requires genuine devolution of authority to these institutions (Asante and Ayee 2004:5).
Some countries have responded positively to these arguments. Bolivia, for example, made decentralization across several sectors part of a package of anti-poverty reforms in the 1990s (Pacheco 2004:85, 90). Most West African countries have also declared local development a prime goal of their decentralization efforts (Ribot 2002:8).
Despite its theoretical potential, the record of decentralization has been decidedly mixed. This is true both in general and with respect to poverty reduction. In some instances, efforts to decentralize management of forests, land, water, and fisheries have shown positive outcomes: rural citizens conserving their natural resources; local councils that are increasing revenues from resource use; the poor more involved in local governance institutions and reaping more monetary benefits from local resources; and local governments providing better basic services. One of the longest-standing cases of decentralized environmental management with evident benefits to livelihoods is in Kumaon, India. Since the 1930s, elected forest councils, called van panchayats, have had the right to manage forest use, raising revenue from the sale of fodder and dead trees and enforcing regulations on forest use (Ribot 2004:22).
Similarly, some wildlife co-management schemes in Africa have yielded improved local infrastructure such as roads and schools, while community forest management in Mexico that has come about through decentralization has enabled communities to build water networks, schools, and clinics (Shyamsundar et al. 2004:9). In Ghana, devolution of power to district assemblies has improved provision of basic services and infrastructure in rural areas through construction of more feeder roads, clinics, public toilets, classrooms, and the like (Asante and Ayee 2004:8).
Yet in most decentralization efforts to date, the intended benefits for local democracy and for the poor remain largely unrealized, due to flawed implementation of the reforms. The choice of which institutions to empower with new management or decision-making responsibilities, and the ways in which those institutions are held accountable to the people, have profound implications for the effectiveness of decentralization—and whether the benefits reach the poor (Ribot 2004:25).
