Despite the theoretical potential for PES programs to benefit the rural poor, many current programs present serious obstacles to the inclusion of poor households. This reflects the fact that PES programs were originally designed primarily to meet conservation goals rather than support the livelihoods of the poor. The Costa Rican program, for example, grew out of the Forestry Department, and its structure favored larger and wealthier landowners (Rosa et al. 2003:16-19). A survey in one Costa Rican watershed found that while all of the large landholders (owning more than 80 ha) were participating in the program, only one third of small landholders (owning less than 10 ha) had signed up (Miranda et al. 2003:21-22)
The obstacles to including the poor in PES programs mirror many of the problems holding them back from other forms of environmental income. The Costa Rican case, which has been one of the most thoroughly studied, has faced several of these:
Tenure and formal titles. Secure property rights are one of the foundations of a PES program. Land ownership is almost always used to identify who should rightfully receive payments. That leaves those without secure tenure
